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During the last twenty-five years, the literature of the health
care profession has documented a serious and persistent prob-
lem-the undertreatment of pain and the failure to effectively ad-
dress suffering in the clinical setting.2 Generally speaking, clini-
cians have escaped both professional sanctions and malpractice
liability for what would seem to be a serious dereliction of duty.
3
There is a marked and curious disparity between the way in which
patients and the lay public view the responsibility of caregivers to
deal with pain and suffering, and the way in which the providers
themselves view their responsibility.4 The argument of this article is
1. ALBERT SCHWEITZER, ON THE EDGE OF THE PRIMEVAL FOREsT AND MORE
FROM THE PRIMEVAL FOREST 116 (1948).
2. See generally infra notes 30-34. Even a representative sampling of this
literature will not adequately convey its magnitude. What is as revealing as the
literature itself is what does not appear, which is any study, survey, or even article
or opinion piece suggesting either that the data and the conclusions drawn from
it-that pain is widely, persistently, and systematically undertreated by health care
professionals-are flawed, exaggerated, or inconsistent with the real world
experience of other health care professionals.
3. See infra Section IX.E.
4. See Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 306 NEW
[Vol. 26:1
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that health care providers in general, and physicians in particular
because of their control over prescription medications, have both
an ethical and a legal duty to relieve the pain and suffering of their
5patients whenever possible. Health care providers also should not
inflict unnecessary pain and suffering. Moreover, because of
changing public and professional attitudes toward this duty, clini-
cians will not in the future, as they have in the past, be able to es-
cape liability for failure to meet this duty to their patients.7
There are three basic categories of pain: acute, cancer, and
chronic nonmalignant (sometimes referred to as "intractable") .
Cancer pain, and pain associated with other terminal or progressive
and incurable conditions, is sometimes considered to be within the
special domain of palliative medicine or hospice care.9 Such pa-
tients, as a general rule, tend to fare better with regard to pain con-
trol because it is a recognized tenet of clinical practice that if a pa-
tient is terminally ill, then it is appropriate to cease and desist from
aggressive curative measures and to concentrate instead on pallia-
tion, which is characterized by a singular focus on maximizing the
patient's quality of life.'0 This sharp distinction between curative
and palliative medicine is problematic, for it suggests that so long
as curative measures are underway, the physician's responsibility to
ENG. J. MED. 639, 640 (1982). Cassell notes this disparity when he observes that
"[t]he relief of suffering, it would appear, is considered one of the primary ends of
medicine by patients and lay persons, but not by the medical profession." Id.
5. See infra Section VIII.D-E.
6. See infra Section VIII.D-E.
7. See generally Shannon Brownlee et al., The Quality of Mercy, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1997, at 54 (describing the increasing empathy in the
medical community toward chronic pain).
8. See RONALD MELZACK & PATRICK D. WALL, THE CHALLENGE OF PAIN 52-56
(1982). While some of the basic textbooks on pain continue to identify only two
broad categories of pain (acute and chronic), a further distinction between
chronic nonmalignant pain and cancer pain acknowledges the different
trajectories that pain will take in the course of the patient's illness. See id. That is,
the latter will likely increase with the progression of the illness until death, while
the former will likely be a lifelong affliction with which the patient must cope.
9. Palliative medicine is defined as "the study and management of patients
with active, progressive, far-advanced disease for whom the prognosis is limited
and the focus of care is the quality of life." OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PALLIATIVE
MEDICINE 3 (Derek Doyle et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998). For purposes of this article,
hospice care will be considered comprehensive palliative care that is provided
under the auspices of a hospice, whether it is an in-patient unit or home hospice.
For a more extensive discussion of the nature of hospice, see MARCIA LATTANZI-
LICHT ET AL., THE HOSPICE CHOICE: IN PURSUIT OF A PEACEFUL DEATH 44-57 (1998).
10. See OXFoRD TEXTBOOK OF PALLIATIVE MEDICINE, supra note 9, at 3.
20001
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the patient does not include, in any significant way, making the pa-
tient comfortable and being concerned about quality of life." A
fundamental thesis of this article is that allowing a patient to expe-
rience unnecessary pain and suffering of any form is substandard
and unethical medical practice regardless of the nature of the pa-
tient's condition or the goals of medical intervention.
12
Section II will survey the literature documenting the extent to
which caregivers fail to address issues of pain and suffering in their
patients. 3 As noted at the outset, this failure has been consistently
documented in the professional literature for over two decades, a
period in which, ironically, major advances have been achieved in
pain management strategies and techniques. Section III will de-
fend the proposition that the medical profession has, in a very real
sense, cultivated its ignorance of the major advancements in pain
management strategies and modalities. In the process the medi-
cal profession has sent forth generation after generation of young
physicians armed only with the myths, misinformation, and anach-
ronistic views about pain relief that were formed by teachers and
mentors many decades ago.
Section IV will consider the most salient and singular aspect of
pain and suffering in the clinical setting, its subjectivity. 15 Perhaps
more than any other factor, the objective nonverifiability of a pa-
tient's complaints of pain contributes to the willingness of health
care professionals to dismiss or discount the extent of suffering the
patient reports. Section V discusses the prevailing curative model
of medical practice and considers how it has rigidly dictated the
profession's values, priorities, and goals with regard to patient
care. 6 Curative measures have been viewed as at the opposite end
of the clinical continuum from palliative measures, such that pri-
oritizing efforts to make a patient comfortable and to relieve suffer-
ing are seen as tantamount to "giving up" on the patient and de-
claring that there is no hope and nothing more that medicine has
11. See infta Section V.
12. For purposes of this article, "unnecessary pain and suffering" will refer to
pain, and the suffering which its persistence engenders, that could be safely and
effectively relieved by the application of currently available knowledge, skills, and
interventions, both pharmacological and non-pharmacological.
13. See infra Section II.
14. See infra Section III.
15. See infra Section IV.
16. See infra Section V.
[Vol. 26:1
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Section VI explores the role of social and cultural perspectives
and attitudes on the undertreatment of pain. 7 Western culture has
a profound ambivalence toward the pain and suffering we encoun-
ter in life, and the extent to which it is reasonable and appropriate
to expect or demand that health care professionals offer relief.
Section VII poses the question whether, current approaches to the
contrary notwithstanding, there is, in fact, a duty on the part of
health care professionals in general, and physicians in particular, to
seek to relieve the pain and suffering of their patients. 8 This sec-
tion argues that such a duty does exist; potential sources as well as
the scope of such a duty are considered.' 9
Section VIII reviews in some detail the most often-cited barri-
ers to effective pain management. 20 One of the most significant,
noted initially in section 111,21 is that far too many clinicians lack
knowledge and skill in pain relief22 The roots of this ignorance can
be traced to the medical schools that train health care profession-
als. These schools have continued to resist incorporating pain
management and palliative care into their curricula despite the un-
controverted evidence that their graduates lack the knowledge,
skills, and attitudes necessary to appropriately relieve many types of
pain. While the culpability of these educational institutions may
not be legal in nature, it is, at the very least, moral. Perhaps the
most significant barrier, in the sense that all others may flow from
it, is the psychosocial phenomenon aptly referred to as "opiopho-
bia."23 While this unreasoning fear of and distaste for the use of
opioid analgesics is not confined to the United States, the decades-
old "war on drugs" has clearly exacerbated the problem here be-
cause state medical licensing boards and the physicians whom they
regulate have been "conscripted" into that war, much to the detri-
17. See infra Section VI.
18. See infia Section VII.A-B.
19. See infra Section VII.A-B.
20. See infra Section VIII.A-D.
21. See infra Section III.
22. See infra Section III.
23. The term "opiophobia" refers to the unscientific and irrational fears that
many people, including many health care professionals, have about the dangers
and evils of narcotics, even when prescribed to relieve pain. See Ann M. Martino,
In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain: What Can Medial
Boards Do?2, 26J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 336 (1998).
2000]
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ment of their patients with severe and persistent pain. 24
Curiously, another significant barrier is that hospitals have
only recently begun to make effective pain management an institu-
tional priority such that medical and nursing staff might expect to
incur adverse consequences for failure to provide this essential as-
pect of patient care.25 While hospital protocols routinely provide
for the monitoring of vital signs, patients are less regularly asked
about the level of their pain, or promptly and effectively cared for if
they report it.26 The nursing staff's customary response is that the
schedule specified by the attending physician for the administra-




Section IX suggests that there are legal means available to con-
firm and enforce a professional duty to provide effective pain re-
lief.28 The need for and appropriateness of strong ethical and legal
standards for the care of pain patients is reasonable. It is arguably
the only effective way to raise the unconscionably low standard of
care that now prevails in health care outside of the hospice and
pain clinic settings. Clinical practice guidelines, promulgated by a
national agency, provide an excellent example of an appropriate
standard to which physicians should be held for pain management.' 9
II. MODERN MEDICINE'S LEGACY OF PAIN
The failure to address, in action rather than merely in rheto-
ric, the medical community's failure to address pain management
is both a perplexing and disturbing phenomenon. For the last
twenty-five years, by far the most frequently discussed issue in law
journal articles on health care has been the crisis in medical mal-
practice litigation.0 Similarly, in bioethics journals the two issues
24. Another way of articulating the same phenomenon and its problematic
consequences is offered by physician and bioethicist Steven Miles: "cancer
patients have been the victims of friendly fire in the war against drugs." See Phebe
Saunders Haugen, Pain Relieffor the Dying: The Unwelcome Intervention of the Criminal
Law, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 325, 337 n.76 (1997).
25. See infra Section VIII.A-B.
26. See infra Section VIII.A-B.
27. See infra Section VIII.A-B.
28. See infra Section IX.A-E.
29. See infra Section IX.D.
30. The term "crisis" frequently appears in the title of articles on the subject
of medical practice. See, e.g., DavidJ. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice
[Vol. 26:1
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which competed for the tide of "most discussed" are abortion 3' and
the right to die.2 Thus medical ethics and medical jurisprudence
have been singularly inattentive to the epidemic of undertreated
pain.33 However, in medical and nursing literature, as well as a
number of important books, the scope and magnitude of the prob-
lem has been starkly revealed. For example, in a 1978 book Steven
Brena wrote:
The epidemic of chronic disabling pain in our society has
magnified a strictly medical problem into a major social
issue. Just as pain in the individual is a warning that
something is wrong either physically or emotionally-
quite often both-the pain epidemic can be viewed as an
alarm signaling to us that something is wrong with our
social philosophy and laws. 4
Brena correctly indicates that the epidemic of untreated or
undertreated pain is an extremely complex, multi-dimensional
35problem. The source of this complexity, as will be discussed at
Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495
(1988); Michael J. Saks, In Search of the "Lawsuit Crisis," 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 77 (1986).
31. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw 935 (2d ed. 1991). As the
editors of this health law casebook observe: "[T]he amount, nature and diversity
of the academic writing on abortion is truly remarkable. The writings range from
the polemic to the theological, and sometimes both are contained in the same
books and articles (on both sides of the issue)." Id.
32. The "right to die" is admittedly a problematic term, since in academic
discourse as well as the popular press it has come to include a broad range of
questions from the right to refuse life-sustaining medical interventions to
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 7.8, at 246 (1986); Kate E. Bloch, Note,
The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander Duty to
Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929, 933-34 (1987); Catherine D. Shaffer,
Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 350 (1986).
The issue vividly demonstrates the way in which medical jurisprudence and
medical ethics have become virtual Siamese twins in that many of the same
"authorities" discuss the fine points of legal, ethical, and metaphysical issues
surrounding human dying and death in a wide range of academic publications.
33. See, e.g., Ben A. Rich, A Legacy of Silence: Bioethics and the Culture of Pain, 18
J. MED. HUMAN. 233 (1997).
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length in section VI,36 is the remarkable ambivalence with which
Western culture regards pain.3' However, this section focuses on
the medical aspect of the problem.
One proposition, which at this time is virtually beyond scientific
dispute, is: most pain that patients experience can be safely and ef-
fectively controlled.38 There is a strong consensus that while ninety
percent of all pain experienced by patients can be relieved, in ex-
cess of fifty percent (perhaps as much as seventy to eighty percent)
of the pain experienced by patients is not relieved.3 9 The nature
and extent of the problem of undertreated pain began to be
documented and discussed in the early 1970s, most notably in a
study appearing in a highly regarded medical journal. 0 This study
of inpatients at two major New York City teaching hospitals re-
vealed that a substantial number of patients who were being treated
for pain continued to have significant levels of pain despite the
treatment.4' When questioned as a part of the study, the physicians
responsible for the care of these patients demonstrated knowledge
deficits about the therapeutic dose range for the narcotic analge-
sics they were prescribing.42 The physicians also had significant
misunderstanding of the nature of addiction and the risks it posed
to patients being treated for pain.43 The study reached a number of
important conclusions." It found that "excessive and unrealistic
concern about the danger of addiction in the hospitalized medical
patient is a significant and potent force for undertreatment with
narcotics." 5 Toward the end of the article, the authors issued an
36. See infra Section VI.
37. See infra Section VI.
38. See MELZACK & WALL, supra note 8, at 52-56 (supporting this basic
proposition and discussing the causal and therapeutic mechanism of pain in a
highly regarded text).
39. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND
PALLIATIWE CARE (1990).
40. See Richard M. Marks & Edward J. Sachar, Undertreatment of Medical
Inpatients with Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 173, 173-81 (1973).
41. See id. at 174-76.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 177-80.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 180. It is important to note that most of the physicians surveyed
were not senior physicians with outdated information about narcotics and their
effects, but internal medicine residents who should be privy to the most current
information. See id. at 177. Because of this situation, the authors were sufficiently
moved by the consistent reports of inadequate pain relief by the patients to call for
[Vol. 26:1
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admonition that was singularly prophetic when viewed from the
perspective of the current movement for physician-assisted suicide
(PAS): "no patient should ever wish for death because of his physi-
cian's reluctance to use adequate amounts of potent narcotics.
"
4
The relationship between the undertreatment of pain and the PAS
movement is the subject of considerable debate.47
A review of the medical and nursing literature in the more
than two decades since these findings and recommendations were
published reveals a desultory chronicle of clinical ignorance and
indifference to patient suffering.48 An important work appearing in
1977 documented another of the widely recognized barriers to ef-
fective pain management, the failure of health care institutions
generally, and hospitals in particular, to make pain relief a prior-
ity.49 The authors of this study make the following remarkable as-
sessment:
Chief among the difficulties facing anyone who would
reform current practices of pain management in our
hospitals is the far from obvious fact that most aspects of
pain work are peripheral to the attention and the
responsibilities of the staff. By responsibilities we mean
not merely the staffs perceived responsibilities, but also
its actual legal and organizational ones. We are asserting,
in other words, that the staff is not genuinely accountable for
much of its interaction with or behavior toward patients in
pain.
a major initiative to reeducate physicians about the proper and adequate use of
narcotic analgesics. See id. at 181.
46. Id. (quoting JAFFE J., The Pharmacologic Basis of Therapeutics 247 (3d ed.
1966)).
47. See, e.g., Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compassionate Response to Medical
Failure, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED., 1384, 1384-87 (1992); Kathleen M. Foley, The
Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient Requests for Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 6J. PAIN& SYMPT. MGMT. 289, 289-97 (1991).
48. A representative sampling, in chronological order, of this literature
follows. See infra notes 49-86.
49. See generally SHIZUKO Y. FAGERHAUGH & ANSELM STRAUSS, POLITICS OF PAIN
MANAGEMENT: STAFF-PATIENT INTERACTION (1977).
50. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). It has only been quite recently the Joint
Commission for the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations [hereinafter
JCAHO] has included a standard in the chapter of its Accreditation Manual on
"Patient Rights and Organizational Ethics" on decisions relative to care at the end
of life that calls upon accredited institutions to demonstrate the existence and
utilization of mechanism designed to address, among other things, "effectively
20001
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Among the problems created by this lack of accountability for
effective pain relief on the part of either the medical or the nursing
staff of most hospitals is that the quality of pain relief any particular
patient receives will vary widely depending upon the physicians and
nurses who are caring for that patient. Given the woefully inade-
quate medical and nursing education and training in pain man-
agement, about which more will be said in sections to follow, 5' it
should not surprise us that the authors conclude that "more often
than not they manage it [pain] badly."52
If we move ahead twelve years in the medical literature, we
might reasonably hope to find studies and reports that indicate that
improvements in the quality of care of patients with pain have be-
come evident. After all, over ten years have passed since the prob-
lem was definitively documented and realistic solutions outlined.95
Given the intrinsic beneficence of the medical and nursing profes-
sions, surely the clinical and academic leaders will have responded
to the call for better education designed to foster more humane
treatment of patients. 4 Some of the best evidence for the changes
that may have been wrought appeared in the 1989 edition of Ad-
vances in Pain Research and Therapy.5 5  One article in particular
managing pain." See Rights and Ethics Chapter of the Accreditation Manual, R.I.1.2.8.
The new standards read:
Pain can be a common part of the patient experience; unrelieved pain
has adverse physical and psychological effects. The patient's rights to
pain management is respected and supported. The health organization
plans, supports, and coordinates activities and resources to assure the
pain of all patients is recognized and addressed appropriately.
A legitimate concern, however, has been that the context of this standard suggests
that according to the JCAHO, only the dying patient has a right to effective pain
management, when, as this section of the article is intended to make abundantly
clear, all hospitalized patients are at significant risk of having their pain
undertreated. In June of 1999JCAHO adopted new standards for pain assessment
and management for all patients, thereby eliminating the concern that the
standard only applied to dying patients. Given the date of the Fagerhaugh and
Strauss study, one can only speculate as to what might account for the delay of
over 20 years in establishing some form of institutional accountability in this
important aspect of patient care.
51. See infra Sections III, VI.
52. See FAGERHAUGH & STRAUSS, supra note 49, at 273.
53. See supra notes 48-52.
54. See infra notes 55-86.
55. See John P. Morgan, American Opiophobia: Customary Underutilization of
[Vol. 26:1
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sought to discern improvements in physicians' knowledge and atti-
tudes about prescribing practices for narcotic analgesics since
Marks and Sachar's 1973 study.56 The answer to the question di-
rectly posed in the article-"has the practice changed?"-is a re-
sounding "no."57 The reasons for the lack of change are clear and
consistent with the findings of Marks and Sachar: "Prescribers fear
drug dependence and addiction as a result of their prescribing of
opioids, so they prescribe less than is necessary to treat pain. This
improper use is accompanied by evidence of faulty pharmacologi-
cal and clinical information about opioids in general ....
Another article appearing in the same volume, written by one
of the pre-eminent pain specialist in the United States, also refers
to "rampant opiophobia" among health care professionals. 59 The
article concludes that "most physicians lack sufficient knowledge of
the clinical pharmacologic approaches" that would be necessary for
them to assume responsibility "to manage acute and chronic pain
in medical illness effectively. "60
The chronicle of undertreated pain continued the following
year with an article by Ronald Melzack, author of one of the most
celebrated treatises on pain, titled The Tragedy of Needless Pain.61 As
with the other authors cited above, Melzack decries the astounding
amount of medical mythology and misinformation that influences
physicians' prescribing practices for the treatment of pain.
6 2
Finally, late in 1995 came the publication of the remarkable
"Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes
and Risks of Treatments" (SUPPORT).63 This massive study, involv-
ing more than 9000 patients in five teaching hospitals across the
United States, was conducted in two phases. 4 Phase I documented
shortcomings in communication, frequency of aggressive treat-
Opioid Analgesics, 11 ADV. PAIN RES. & THERAPY 181, 181-82 (1989).
56. See supra note 40 and accompany text.
57. Id.
58. See Morgan, supra note 55, at 183.
59. Kathleen M. Foley, The "Decriminalization" of Cancer Pain, 11 ADV. PAIN RES.
&THERAPY5, 15 (1989).
60. Id.
61. Ronald Melzack, The Tragedy of Needless Pain, Sci. AM., Feb. 1990, at 27.
62. See id.
63. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care
for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patient: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for
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ment, and the general characteristics of death in a large, tertiary
care hospital.65 The results of Phase I indicated extremely poor
communication between caregivers and patients or between care-
givers and patient's families.66 The poor communication resulted
in numerous, unwanted, aggressive clinical interventions of dubi-
ous benefit, disregard of advance directives, and moderate to se-
vere pain in one-half of the patients during the days immediately
prior to death.67 Phase II sought to improve the care of seriously ill
or dying patients by utilizing a highly skilled nurse to facilitate dis-
cussions between caregivers and patients and/or between caregiv-
ers and patients' families.& The goal was to increase the extent to
which patient wishes and values informed clinical decision mak-
ing. Remarkably, the Phase II intervention had no impact what-
soever on any of the areas targeted for improvement, including
pain control.70 The SUPPORT investigators' conclusion contained
substantially more pathos than the typical biomedical research re-
port:
The picture we describe of the care of the seriously ill or
dying persons is not attractive. One would certainly
prefer to envision that, when confronted with life-
threatening illness, the patient and family would be
included in discussions, realistic estimates of outcome
would be valued, pain would be treated, and dying would
not be prolonged. That is still a worthy vision.
However... [s]uccess will require reexamination of our
individual and collective commitment to these goals, and
more creative efforts at shaping the treatment process,
and, perhaps, more proactive and forceful attempts at
change.
This same language could be fittingly applied to the plight of
patients with pain, i.e., the clinical chronicle of the last quarter cen-
tury with regard to pain management is not attractive. Realization
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1592.
67. See id. at 1593-94.
68. See id. at 1592.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1594-95.
71. Id. at 1597.
12
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of a vision of the health care system cleansed of ignorance, indif-
ference, fear, and a lack of accountability, while worthy, will clearly
require "more creative efforts at shaping the treatment processes"
and "more proactive and forceful attempts at change." Publication
of the results of SUPPORT prompted commentary in the clinical
72and bioethical literature. One of the more plausible explanations
for why the remedial measures implemented in the second phase
of the study proved to be such a dismal failure is a systemic one."
The five study sites have systems in place that are designed to de-
liver the latest innovations in life-saving (or at least life-extending)
high technology medicine to critically ill patients.74 Considered
from this perspective they are highly effective. These systems are
not designed to prioritize or even to take into account any of
SUPPORT's special considerations: maximizing physician-patient
(or physician-family) communication and agreement about do not
resuscitate (DNR) orders, minimizing the provision of unwanted or
marginally beneficial interventions, or assuring the prompt and ef-
fective relief of pain and suffering.75 Consequently, if these objec-
tives are to be realized in the critical care setting, the existing sys-
tems must be modified or entirely redesigned.
SUPPORT provides solid evidence that curative medicine fails
to meet the dying patients' needs, and indeed fails to even recog-
77 
7nize such a category of patients. Other studies,78 and the sus-
tained work of those such as medical anthropoligist and physician
Arthur Kleinman, 79 demonstrate that the curative model also vic-
timizes those with chronic illness.80 Both types of patients require
the approach of palliative medicine, in which care is tailored to the
individual patient, according to that patient's actual and perceived
72. See generally Dying Well in the Hospital: The Lessons of Support, HASTINGS CTR.




76. See Bernard Lo, End-of-Life Care After Termination of Support, HASTINGS CTR.
REP. (Special Supp.) Nov.-Dec. 1995, at S7.
77. See supra notes 64-76.
78. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ferrell et al., Pain in the Nursing Home, 38 J. Am.
GERIATRICS Soc'y 409 (1990); Paula R. Mobily et al., An Epidemiological Analysis of
Pain in the Elderly: The Iowa 65+ Rural Health Study, 6 J. AGING & HEALTH 139
(1994).
79. See infra note 126.
80. See infra Section V.
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needs, as well as to their personal values and preferences.8" Hu-
manistic qualities and interpersonal skills are at least as important
as clinical or scientific acumen when it comes to palliative medi-
82cine. It appears that only under this model are the amelioration
of pain and other symptoms recognized as a legitimate and an im-
portant goal of medicine. Section IX will consider a role for the
law in changing medicine's culture of pain. 4
III. THE CULTIVATION OF IGNORANCE
The medical component of the answer to the obvious question
of why caregivers fail to provide adequate pain relief to patients in
so many instances when it is their power to do so is perhaps most
succinctly stated by the late John Bonica, a past President of the In-
ternational Association for the Study of Pain: "Physicians are
poorly trained to manage pain properly. They rely on drugs, which
are often ineffective, prescribe too small doses, and often wait for
pain before they do something." 5 Dr. Bonica's remarkable asser-
tion was true when he made it and, as we have seen, it continues to
be true today. One significant root of the problem is that the typi-
cal medical school curriculum is essentially devoid of courses on
pain management."' In 1989, Dr. Bonica could state unequivocally:
"No medical school has a pain curriculum.""' Several years later the
situation remained unchanged .8 Despite the increased attention
81. See infta Section V.
82. See infra Section V.
83. See Ellen Fox, Predominance of the Curative Model of Medical Care: A Residual
Problem, 278JAMA 761, 762 (1997).
84. See infra Section IX.A-E.
85. 2 NEWSLETTER OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE TREATMENT OF
INTRACTABLE PAIN 3 (1979) (interviewing Dr. John Bonica).
86. See infra Section VIII.D.
87. See Richard S. Weiner, An Interview with John J. Bonica, M.D., 1 PAIN
PRACTITIONER 2 (1989).
88. See Foley, supra note 47, at 291; Interview with Deborah Drew, Clinical
Nurse Specialist for Palliative Care, Fairview Pain Management Center, in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 14, 1999). Drew received her Masters Degree in
Nursing from the University of Minnesota. See id. She began her career in cancer
care and hospice treatment. See id. For the past decade she has focused her
clinical expertise in pain management consultations. See id. In 1996, Drew
opened the University of Minnesota Hospice Center. See id. In 1998, she helped
create the Fairview Pain Management Center. See id. Drew states that efforts in
Minnesota by the Minnesota Cancer Pain Initiative and American Cancer Society
include free mailings to every professional school materials on pain management.
[Vol. 26:1
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given to the need to improve the quality of care provided to dying
patients, according to two prominent medical educators: "its role
in clinical practice and medical education in the United States re-
mains ill defined."90 While palliative care encompasses much more
than simply pain management, one of the essential clinical compe-
tencies for providing appropriate care to dying patients is pain and
symptom assessment and management.9' In a 1991 poll of class
presidents of all American Medical schools, more than twenty-five
percent of the respondents indicated that one hour or less of class
time in their institution had been devoted to any aspect of terminal
92care.
Common sense and common experience shows that medical
school and nursing school curriculum committees have precluded
pain from entering their curricula in any significant way. This is
not because only a small subset of the patients cared for by the
typical physician or nurse experiences a problem with pain, or that
terminal illness rarely produces pain. Brega's use of the term "epi-
demic" with regard to the prevalence of chronic pain in America
has been confirmed by subsequent studies.9 For example, five mil-
lion Americans suffer from back pain alone, of which two million
are so disabled that they cannot work.94 It has been estimated that
one family in three includes a victim of persistent pain, and that for
sixty million Americans the level of pain severity was sufficiently
high to produce partial or total disability.
95
The message of medical education comes through loud and
clear: pain may be a widespread psychosocial problem, but it is nei-
ther perceived nor acknowledged to be a medical problem.96 If it
See id.
89. This kind of care is referred to as palliative care. See Donald G. Casswell,
Rejecting Criminal Liability for Life-Shortening Palliative Care, 6J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y127, 130 (1990).
90. See J. Andrew Billings & Susan Block, Palliative Care in Undergraduate
Medical Education: Status Report and Future Directions, 278JAMA 733, 733 (1997).
91. See AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, CARING FOR THE DYING:
IDENTIFICATION AND PROMOTION OF PHYSICIAN COMPETENCY 41 (1996).
92. See Billings & Block, supra note 90, at 734.
93. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
94. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, CHRONIC PAIN: HOPE THROUGH
RESEARCH, Pub. No. 90-2406, 2-3 (1989).
95. See John J. Bonica & C. Richard Chapman, Biology, Pathophysiology, and
Therapy of Chronic Pain, AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 721-22 (2d ed. 1986).
96. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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were, given its prevalence in our society, surely medical schools
would be training physicians to deal effectively with it.97 Further,
medical licensing boards would be disciplining physicians who fail
to develop and maintain competence in pain management for
their patients. Neither do anything of the sort.98 However, during
the last fifteen to twenty years, some quite prominent academic
physicians have become significantly more strident in their con-
demnation of their own profession's indifference to, or at least in-
competence in ameliorating, the suffering of their patients.9"
97. One argument often voiced by medical school administrators is that
exponential growth in medical science and technology has made it impossible to
incorporate into the medical school curriculum, including residency training
programs, everything that a competent physician needs to know. While this may
well be the case, it simply indicates that medical educators have a responsibility to
establish priorities when determining what must be included in the medical school
curriculum and what may be reasonably left for the young physician to acquire
elsewhere. The case that has yet to be made is that minimal competence in pain
management and palliative care would fail to make the list of essential topics to be
included in the basic medical school curriculum.
98. Quite recently, signs of possible changes in licensing board attitudes have
begun to appear. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Amid New Calls for Pain Relief New Calls
for Caution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at Fl. The Medical Board of California
expressed the traditional view when it responded to a complaint by the daughter
of a terminal cancer patient against the physician whom she alleged had failed to
adequately manage his pain. See id. The Board declared that while "pain
management for your father was indeed inadequate," no disciplinary action
against the physician would be taken. See id. In 1999, however, the Oregon Board
of Medical Examiners announced that it would be taking disciplinary action
against a pulmonary specialist for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct and
gross or repeated acts of negligence. SeeAP Newswires, Roseburg Doctor Faces Penalty
on Pain Contro4 Mar. 27, 1999, available in 1999 WESTLAW database
APWIRESPLUS. The accusations were based on six cases between 1993 and 1998
in which the physician had failed to administer appropriate pain relief to gravely
or terminally ill patients. See id. Similarly, the Nevada State Board of Medical
Examiners notified physicians in April of 1999 that failure to control pain by using
controlled substances in accordance with recently issued guidelines would result in
potential license revocation. SeeNEVADA STATE BoARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, NEW
REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD ADOPTED MARCH 15, 1999 (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.state.nv.us./medical/newsletters/vol21.html>.
99. Two articles in particular, separated by nearly 10 years, are particularly
significant with regard to this point. The first, written by 12 distinguished
physician educators, states unequivocally: "To allow a patient to experience
unbearable pain or suffering is unethical medical practice." Sidney H. Wanzer et
al., The Physician's Responsibility Towards Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, 320
NEW ENG. J. MED, 844, 847 (1989). The second article, by one of the founding
fathers of American bioethics, declares, "[N]ot to relieve pain optimally is
tantamount to moral and legal malpractice." See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Emerging
Ethical Issues in Palliative Care, 279JAMA 1521, 1521 (1998). While Dr. Pellegrino's
[Vol. 26:1
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When we consider the particular forms of pain and suffering
that are associated with the dying process, medical education fares
no better.' ° As will be discussed in more detail in section V, the
curative model of medical practice has dominated the medical
school curriculum.'01 The palliative model is at best tolerated in
elective courses taken by a very small percentage of any graduating
medical school class.102 A recent study revealed that "graduating
medical students and house staff lack important training in the
care of the dying, feel ill-prepared for this work, and are eager for
more training.""3
Efforts to address concerns about the curative model of medi-
cal education and practice have resulted in an initiative to access
not only medical students' knowledge and skills, but also physi-
cians' other essential attributes.0 4 Attributes essential to a physician
include personal qualities, values and attitudes such as compassion,
empathy, and altruism.0 5 Furthermore, in the area of skills, the
American Association of Medical Colleges' most recent set of learn-
ing objectives for medical students includes "[k]nowledge about re-
lieving pain and ameliorating the suffering of patients."
106
IV. THE METAPHYSICS OF PAIN
Perhaps the most persistent and eloquent critique of the way
in which physicians fail to effectively deal with their patient's pain
and suffering is by Eric Cassell.' 7 He criticizes medicine's failure to
address the pain and suffering engendered by illness and offers the
beginning of an explanation for the absence of pain management
use of the phrase "moral and legal malpractice" may be somewhat confusing, it
does seem clear from the context that his message is that allowing patients to
experience unnecessary pain and suffering is both a violation of medical ethics
and a departure from an acceptable standard of care, the sine qua non of
professional negligence.
100. See infra Section VIII.D.
101. See infra Section V.
102. See infra Section VIII.
103. Billings & Block, supra note 90, at 734.
104. See generally AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL COLLEGES, TAKING CHARGE
OF THE FUTURE: THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL COLLEGES
(1995).
105. See id. at 4.
106. See id. at 7.
107. See ERicJ. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING (1991).
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in the medical curriculum. 8 In his book The Nature of Suffering,
Cassell begins with these words: "The test of a system of medicine
should be its adequacy in the face of suffering; this book starts from
the premise that modern medicine fails that test. In fact, the cen-
tral assumptions on which twentieth-century medicine is founded
provide no basis for an understanding of suffering." °9 Dr. Cassell's
explanation suggests that this moral failing has a metaphysical
foundation." 0 Modem medicine has been shaped by the Cartesian
dualism of mind and body."' If physical and mental substance exist
in separate and incommensurate realms, and medicine's role has
been to treat the diseases of the physical body, then to characterize
pain as a phenomenon of consciousness and suffering as an expe-
rience of persons, not bodies,"' then the responsibility for dealing
with pain and suffering has necessarily been removed from the
physician's job description. There is an exception, however, and
that is pain, which can be directly traced to, and is entirely com-
mensurate with, some objectively discernable tissue injury. Even in
such instances, however, the response of the medical profession has
generally been too little and too late."
3
For purposes of this article, philosophical and psychosocial dis-
tinctions between pain and suffering must be recognized but not
belabored. Pain is often characterized as a sensation, to be distin-
guished from suffering, which is considered an emotion."4 While
pain is generally understood as an unpleasant sensation, not all
pain results in the experience of suffering, and not all suffering is
attended by pain."5 Cassell's thesis is twofold: (1) unrelieved pain
108. See id.
109. Id. at vii.
110. See id.
111. For a general overview of the philosophical problem of mind-body
dualism and the influence of Descartes, see 5-6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
336-45 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
112. See CASSELL, supra note 107, at viii.
113. See Bonica & Chapman, supra note 95, at 721-22.
114. See, e.g., C. S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 78 (1943).
115. The pain of the professional athlete or a pregnant woman during labor
and delivery are examples of pain in the absence of suffering. One need only
consider the patient with no painful symptomatology who has just been diagnosed
with Alzheimer's dementia to understand the idea of suffering in the absence of
painful stimuli. To some extent, however, the transition from a biomedical to a
biocultural model of pain, which take into account the nonphysiological aspects of
the pain experience, blurs earlier distinctions between pain and suffering. See, e.g.,
DAVID B. MORRIS, ILLNESS AND CULTURE IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 118-28 (1998).
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is one of the most common sources of suffering in the clinical con-
text, and (2) a clinician cannot appropriately and effectively re-
spond to a patient's suffering without engaging the patient as a
person.' 6 As he succinctly states: "[b]odies do not suffer; persons
suffer.".. 7 While Cassell eloquently makes the case for the physi-
cian's responsibility to relieve the suffering engendered by illness,
the thesis of this article is more limited. Physicians, as will become
evident in progression of this analysis, have an ethical and a legal
duty to competently provide pain relief to patients so that un-
treated pain and the abandonment of the patient in distress inher-
ent in such an omission do not engender unnecessary suffering.
The legitimacy of Bonica's critique, and that of Cassell's as
well, is bolstered by the Executive Summaries of the detailed clini-
cal practice guidelines recently promulgated by expert panels of
clinicians brought together under the aegis of the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services." 9 The first set of guidelines, con-
cerning the management of acute pain arising out of medical or
surgical procedures or trauma, begins with this justificatory state-
ment: "Clinical surveys continue to indicate that routine orders for
intramuscular injections of opioids 'as needed' fail to relieve pain
in about half of postoperative patients. Recognition of the wide-
spread inadequacy of pain management has prompted recent cor-
rective efforts .....20
Two years later, a very similar statement introduces the guide-
116. See CASSELL, supra note 107, at 32.
117. Id.
118. See infra Section VII. This assertion is hardly a new or a novel contention.
Nearly 20 years ago a deputy editor of the New England Journal of Medicine wrote:
Few things a doctor does are more important than relieving pain. Yet the
treatment of severe pain in hospitalized patients is regularly and
systematically inadequate.... Pain is soul destroying. No patient should
have to endure intense pain unnecessarily. The quality of mercy is
essential to the practice of medicine; here, of all places, it should not be
strained.
Marcia Angell, The Quality of Mercy, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 98, 99 (1982).
119. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, ACUTE PAIN
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lines promulgated by the AHCPR for cancer pain. 12 Since the tis-
sue damage resulting from surgery, trauma, and cancer are almost
always objectively demonstrable, medicine's persistent failure to
adequately attend to them requires more of an explanation than
simply that of residual Cartesian dualism. A patient's complaints of
severe pain following open-heart surgery or in the final stages of
bone cancer are not merely subjective reports unsupported by ob-
jective findings.
If we are to take the explanations offered in medical literature
at face value, particularly under the rubric of "barriers to effective
pain management," a majority of physicians steadfastly maintain
the belief that the risks of pain relief connected with using opioid
analgesics often outweigh the benefits. Physicians generally per-
ceive the risks to be, in order of their clinical significance: prema-
ture death, drug addiction, respiratory depression, and compro-
mised mental status. On this view, in undertreating pain by
underprescribing opioid analgesics, the physician is acting benefi-
cently by sparing the patient the greater of the two evils.'22 Of
course, this is beneficent care on the paternalistic model of the
physician-patient relationship, since the patient is not afforded an




The victims of chronic, nonmalignant pain, sometimes re-
ferred to as "intractable" pain, 124 are the patients who are most of-ten abandoned by medical practitioners. 25 Kleinman explains this
121. SeeAHCPR, MANAGEMENT OF CANCER PAIN 1 (1994).
122. See Melzack, supra note 61, at 27.
123. See id.
124. The term "intractable" is used to describe any condition or situation that
is unmanageable or untreatable. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTIoNARY 1185 (1993). While there are examples of pain and other symptoms
that produce suffering that cannot be relieved, these are exceptions. States which
have recently passed legislation related to the care of patients with intractable pain
are addressing a much larger population of patients with chronic, nonmalignant
pain. Most of these patients have pain which can be alleviated, but only if they are
provided with opioid analgesics on a long-term basis. While this approach remains
controversial, a consensus supporting it when other treatment modalities have
proven inadequate has emerged. See Concensus Statement from the American
Academy of Pain Medicine and the American Pain Society, The Use of Opioids in the
Treatment of Chronic Pain, 13 CLINICALJ. PAIN 6 (1997).
125. "Abandonment" in this context is used broadly, so as to include not only
the refusal to provide care and treatment, but also includes the failure or refusal
to provide therapies that are available and acceptable, such as the prescribing of
[Vol. 26:1
20




If there is a single experience shared by virtually all
chronic pain patients it is that at some point those around
them-chiefly practitioners, but also at times family
members-come to question the authenticity of the
patient's experience of pain.... Chronic pain discloses
that the training and methods of health professionals
appear to prevent them from effectively caring for the
chronically ill. Reciprocally, chronic pain patients are the
bite noire of many health professionals, who find them
excessively demanding, hostile, and undermining of care.
A duet of escalating antagonism ensues, much to the
detriment of the protagonists.Y6
Chronic pain syndromes are almost by definition conditions in
which the degree of objectively verifiable pathology does not ex-
plain (or justify) the patient's complaints of pain and/or claims offunctonal • •127
functional disability. In order for a clinician to discharge the pro-
fessional responsibility to compassionately address such patient's
pain and suffering, there must be a willingness to transcend the
limitations of objective findings and engage with the lived experi-
ence of illness as related by the patient. This is appropriate,
Kleinman maintains, "[b]ecause in the end it is the lived experi-
ence of different individuals."
28
V. CURATIVE VS. PALLIATIVE MEDICINE: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES
Kleinman's eloquent critique of medicine's failure to embrace
pain and suffering in the clinical setting as a professional and ethi-
cal responsibility of physicians, for which they must be properly
opioid analgesics for severe chronic nonmalignant pain. Pseudoaddiction is one
phenomenon that occurs throughout the population of pain patients, but is
especially common among the victims of chronic nonmalignant pain. See Marco
Pappagallo & Leslie J. Heinberg, Ethical Issues in the Management of Chronic
Nonmalignant Pain, in 17 SEMINARS IN NEUROLOGY 203, 205 (1997).
Pseudoaddiction is a range or cluster of behaviors that are suggestive of addiction,
but are the iatrogenic effect of ineffective pain management. See id.
126. ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESs NARRATIVES: SUFFERING, HEALING AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION 57 (1988).
127. See MORRIS, supra note 115, at 119.
128. KLEINMAN, supra note 126, at 60 (emphasis added).
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trained, actually applies to all forms of chronic illness.129 The prob-
lem with medical education, he maintains, is primarily one of fo-
cus:
For the care of the chronically ill, medical education as it
is currently organized can be disastrous. Physicians are
encouraged to believe that disease is more important than
illness, and that all they need is knowledge about biology,
not knowledge about the psychosocial and cultural aspects
of illness.... The social science and humanities compo-
nents of medical education... are poor relations with




Dr. Kleinman extends his critique beyond the four years of
undergraduate medical education to the graduate medical educa-
tion programs that provide the clinical training of young physi-
cians.13' He laments that "at present many training programs tacitly
inculcate values and behaviors that are antithetical to the humane
care of patients."13 2 When the professional products of these pro-
grams encounter the patients whose pain experience is even
slightly inconsistent with physiological findings or clinical expecta-
tions, the physician's most common reaction is to question the
authenticity of the patient's complaints. 13  The all-too-common re-
sponse of caregivers to the patients is to label such patient's re-
quests for more effective medications as "drug-seeking" or addictive
behaviors, and their protestations of physically disabling pain as
"malingering.'' 34 The haste with which some caregivers dismiss or
129. See id. Chronic pain is sometimes further complicated by concurrent
illnesses of psychiatriatic origin, chemical dependency and personality disorders.
See Drew, supra note 88.
130. Kleinman, supra note 126.
131. See Kleinman, supra note 126.
132. Kleinman, supra note 126, at 257.
133. See Kleinman, supra note 126, at 59. Kleinman notes that chronic pain
syndromes are conditions in which the extent of demonstrable pathology is
insufficient to explain the severity of pain reported by the patient or the physical
disability that it is claimed has been produced. See id.
134. The extent to which physicians demonstrate a proclivity for discrediting
or discounting a patient's reporting of symptoms is virtually without parallel in the
practice of medicine. Generally, medical students are taught to listen carefully to
the way in which a patient describes how they feel, and to resist the temptation to
rely too heavily on lab tests or other diagnostic procedures. The negative impact
[Vol. 26:1
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diminish patient complaints pain suggests not only an ambivalence
toward the pain experiences of others, but a more fundamental
quandary about the place of pain in human experience.
The prevailing curative model of medicine is not only hostile
to effective care of chronic pain patients, but to patients with ter-
minal illness as well.13 ' This is because of a widespread notion that
curative medicine is at the other end of a continuum from the
model of end-of-life care-palliative medicine. 7 Indeed, the cura-
tive and palliative models of medicine appear to instanciate dia-
metrically opposite mind-sets and world views.138  The curative
model is focused on diagnosing and curing disease. 9  While the
body of the patient is the locus of the disease, idiosyncratic aspects
of the individual patient as person are credited with little or no sig-
nificance insofar as making the diagnosis and effecting the cure are
considered."4 As one commentator characterized the modus oper-
andi of the curative model:
Clinical concerns are approached as puzzles to be solved;
clinical encounters are treated as occasions for scientific
inquiry. Because the object of analysis is the disease
process and not the patient, symptoms are treated as clues
to diagnosis, instead of as phenomena that are themselves
worthy of treatment.
1 4 1
The curative model devalues or discounts anything that is sub-
jective and, hence, not objectively verifiable and quantifiable. 2
of physician skepticism about patient reports of pain on the essential element of
mutual trust in the patient-physician relationship cannot be underestimated. For
an excellent discussion of the importance of trust, see JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD
OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT, 85-104 (1984).
135. See id.
136. In a recent report on care at the end of life, the Institute of Medicine
concluded that: "Deficiencies in undergraduate, graduate, and continuing
education for end-of-life care reflect a medical culture that defines death as failure
and ignores care for dying people as a source of professional accomplishment and
personal meaning." INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING
CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 207 (MarilynJ. Field & Christine K. Cassel eds., 1997).
137. See Fox, supra note 83, at 762-63.
138. See id.
139. See id at 761.
140. See id. at 762.
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Since pain and suffering, understood as sensation and emotion, are
quintessentially subjective human experiences, they lie outside of
the acceptable parameters of the curative model.'
The sanctum sanctorum of the high priests and acolytes of cura-
tive medicine is the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). In this domain, the
patient's personal identity and subjective experience of illness lose
all relevance.'" Patients are perceived by medical subspecialists in
terms of their component parts.4 5  Clinical rounds in such units
exemplify the narrow focus on the objective and the impersonal.
The discussion of each patient concerns blood gas levels, hemato-
crit, mechanical ventilator settings, and similar products of the di-
agnostic process. 14  Concerns about prognosis too often are re-
duced to proposed interventions by the subspecialists to attempt to
improve the condition or performance of a particular organ.
14
1
Critics of such a slavish adherence to the curative model have
pointed out that such practices are antithetical to the achievement
of a humane and dignified death. 49 One reason for this is that the
143. See id.
144. One need only participate as an observer in clinical rounds in an ICU to
appreciate the extent of the depersonalization of the patient that is brought about
by the curative model. As the team gathers around the bedside of each successive
patient, the physician (usually a resident) presenting the case will begin in a
stylized fashion: "This is Mrs. Jones, a 54-year-old white female who was brought
by ambulance to the hospital on the evening of May 4 with symptoms of acute,
severe chest pain .... " The remainder of the presentation of Mrs. Jones' case will
be a litany of procedures performed, test results, current medical telemetry and
monitor readings, and immediate plans for further tests or procedures. Often the
patient is intibated and on a ventilator, which to many clinicians obviates the need
to interact with the patient during rounds. But even when that is not the case, for
the most part the attention of the participants remains focused on the chart and
the monitors rather than the patient. For further discussion of this phenomenon,





148. Physician and ethnographer Barry Saunders has observed: "The
hospital... can be a profoundly anti-narrative institution." DAVID B. MORRIS, THE
CULTURE OF PAIN 251 (1991). While this tends to be the norm in hospitals, some
have broken stride to recognize pain. At Fairview University Medical Center in
Minnesota, classes for ICU nurses include physical outcomes of uncontrolled pain.
See Drew, supra note 88.
149. See, e.g., HOSPICE AND PALLIATrIvE CARE 12 (Denice C. Sheehan & Walter B.
Forman eds., 1996). One of the fundamental tenets of the hospice movement is
that the patient must accept the discontinuation of all curative or life-sustaining
measures unless they also have a palliative effect which cannot be achieved by any
[Vol. 26:1
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devotees of the curative model, by identifying death as the enemy
and the ultimate failure, have virtually expunged the term "dying"
from the lexicon of the intensive care unit, replacing it with "multi-
organ system failure."5 ' One extremely unfortunate result of this
linguistic legerdemain is that gravely ill patients and their families
cannot be empowered and encouraged to begin to consider end-of-
life decisions and options because "multi-organ system failure" does
not necessarily translate, in lay terms, to "dying."'5 ' Rather, multi-
organ system failure suggests a need for further clinical innovation
by one or more sub-specialists. 5 1 Physicians seem to have reached
the point at which the determination that a patient is dying can
only be made ex post facto. That is, after all of the efforts of the ICU
team and its clinical consultants to reverse the patient's deteriora-
tion fail and the patient goes into irreversible cardiac or pulmonary
arrest, and death is declared following an indefinite period of
cadio-pulmonary resuscitation, then one can perhaps say, retro-
spectively, that for some indeterminate period before the declara-
tion of death the patient must have been dying. 1' The results of
this approach to the care of gravely ill patients were vividly con-
firmed by SUPPORT.
5 4
other (purely) palliative means, such as palliative chemotherapy for some types of
cancer. See id.
150. This author has reached this conclusion after many years of participating
in regular ethics rounds and clinical ethics consultations involving the care of
gravely ill patients, many of whom were actively dying.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. A growing number of clinical specialists in end-of-life care have come to
the conclusion that the presumption that being at the end of life is discernable
may be erroneous. The appropriate response to serious illness requiring intensive
or critical care, they suggest, would be to develop parallel streams of plans: one
which facilitates discussions about death and optimal support of the patient
through death and bereavement; and a second which provides maximal efforts to
restore physiologic balance. See Joanne Lynn et al., Prognoses of Seriously Ill
Hospitalized Patients on the Days Before Death: Implications for Patient Care and Public
Policy, 5 NEW HORIZONS 56, 60 (1997).
154. See SUPPORT, supra note 63, at 1591. This study was conducted in two
phases. See id. The first phase developed baseline data on the care of seriously ill
patients in five medical centers across the United States. See id. at 1592. The data
revealed little or no attention was paid by clinicians to patient directives, the
communication between the treatment team and patients and/or family members
was poor, and at least half of the patients had moderate to severe pain in the days
prior to their death. See id. The second phase sought to improve care in these
three areas through the use of specially trained and experienced nurses. See id.
The data analysis after the second phase indicated that there was essentially no
2000]
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VI. WESTERN CULTURE'S CURIOUS AMBIVALENCE TOWARD PAIN
Pain and suffering in many cultures, including our own, have
long been regarded as punishment for sin or disobedience of di-
vine ordinances. 5 5 Pain of natural origins is viewed as a measure of
156divine justice. However, the actual infliction of pain became a
means to "religious" ends, such as the liberal use of torture during
the Inquisition to extract confessions from heretics.5 A clear sign
of the divine origin of disease, pain or suffering was the inability of
medicine to deal effectively with it. 8 The bubonic plague, for ex-
ample, was considered to have been "a manifestation of 'God's just
anger with our wicked deeds sent.., as a punishment to mortal
men... [which] no doctor's advice, no medicine could overcome
or alleviate."159
If human misery in general, and the pain and suffering of ill-
ness in particular, are considered part of a divine, cosmic plan, re-
lated in some important way to the disposition of divine justice,
then efforts to escape from these torments and afflictions through
the use of narcotics might appear to be unseemly, if not sacrile-
gious. Even in the well-known Book of Job, the long-suffering ser-
vant of Yahweh, his dignity was to be found, according to many Bib-
lical scholars, in the way in which he as a righteous man bore his
many afflictions.' 6°
The idea of suffering as the sine qua non of the human situa-
improvement in the outcomes for patients with regard to these three areas of
concern. See id.
155. The Holy Bible is replete with evidence of this association of pain and
punishment for wickedness. Consider the following two examples from the Book
of Job. "The wicked man travaileth with pain all his days...." Job 5:17 (King
James). "He is chastened also with pain upon his bed and the multitude of his
bones with strong pain. .. ." Job 33:19 (KingJames).
156. See generally Jonathan Boyarin, Another Abraham: Jewishness and the Law of
the Father, 9 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 345, 388 (1997).
157. See Donald Caton, The Secularization of Pain, 62 ANESTHESIOLOGY 493, 494
(1985).
158. See id. at 493-94.
159. Id. at 494 (quoting BoccAccIo G., THE DECAMERON 30-31 (R. Allison, ed.,
1980)).
160. See BERNHARD W. ANDERSON, UNDERSTANDING THE OLD TESTAMENT 514-19
(2d ed. 1966). It is interesting to note, however, that much of the Book of Job
attests to his outrage at God for visiting undeserved suffering upon him. See id. at
514. Only much later, after God reminds him that his finitude precludes him
from judging the Creator, does he repent of his defiance and acquiesce in the
mystery of suffering. See id. at 517-18.
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tion has not remained exclusively within the province of religion.
In delivering the 1935-1937 Gifford Lectures at the University of
Glasgow on the subject "Why are we here?," the humanist W. Mac-
neile Dixon, suggested the following alternative view:
No philosophers, or men of science, have so far had the
hardihood, as far as I know, to deny us our pains. They
relieve us of all else. They have taken from us our
personality, our freedom, our souls, our very selves. They
have, however, left us our sorrows. Let us take, then, as
our foundation the proposition "I suffer, therefore I am."
And let us add to it the converse and equally true
statement, "I am, therefore I suffer."'
61
Dixon, who was not a philosopher by training, but rather a dis-
tinguished professor of English language and literature, is correct
when he suggests that philosophers have been, throughout the his-
tory of Western civilization, singularly inattentive to pain and suf-
fering.16 But in elevating pain and suffering to the ultimate onto-
logical fact of humanity, Dixon makes a secular argument for
enduring, rather than seeking to alleviate, the travails of body and
SOI163soul.
16
Ivan Illich, the great critic of medicine and culture, expressed
a similar attitude decades later.'6' He finds the contemporary pur-
suit of pain relief through the medical arts to signal a radical de-
parture from our European heritage.165 It would have been un-
thinkable "that pain ought not to be suffered, alleviated, and
interpreted by the person affected, but that it should be... de-
stroyed through the intervention of a.. . physician."'6 The reasons
161. SeeW. MAcNEILE DIXON, THE HUMAN SITUATION 90 (1937).
162. See id; see also HenryJohn McCloskey, Pain and Suffering, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ETHICS 927 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992). The
following observation in this regard appears in the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS:
"Knowledge concerning the nature, causes, and extent of human and animal
suffering is of the greatest importance in consequentialist ethics, and most of the
major deontological ethics as well. Yet there is a poverty of writings concerning
pain and suffering both in ethics and philosophical psychology." Id.
163. See DIXON, supra note 161, at 90.
164. See IVAN ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH
(1976).
165. See id.
166. Id. at 149.
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offered by Illich as to why the idea of professional and technical
pain-killing was "alien to all European civilizations" are quite con-
sistent with Dixon's perspective-that pain was the human experi-
ence of a flawed or corrupted universe of which human beings are
very much a part.'67 Furthermore, the very word "patient" has its
classical roots in the Latin patior, which means "to endure pain or
suffering."' 68 To note this, however, is merely to highlight the per-
sistent ambivalence of the medical profession toward pain and suf-
fering as an aspect of the experience of illness. On the one hand
the medical literature is replete with nostrums acknowledging the
primary duty of the physician to relieve pain and suffering. 69 On
the other hand extended discussions of how the physician is to dis-
charge this responsibility rarely appear in medical textbooks 70 or
medical school curricula.
71
There is another perspective on the evolution of the medical
profession's attitude toward pain and suffering that is at variance
from Dixon and Illich. 72 According to this view, as the Age of Faith
gave way to the Age of Reason in Western Europe, the seculariza-
tion of society brought with it in turn a more secularized view of
disease and pain.173 The philosophical perspective which was pro-
moted by John Locke in the seventeenth century, Jeremy Bentham
in the eighteenth century, and John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth
167. See id.
168. SeeXI OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 342-43 (2d ed., 1989).
169. See Ad Hoc Committee on Medical Ethics, American College of Physicians
Ethics Manual, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 129, 131 (1984). The Ethics Manual of
one of the leading national medical organizations states, "[t]he primary goals of
the physician are to relieve suffering, prevent untimely death, and to improve the
health of the patient while maintaining the dignity of the person." Id. at 131.
170. See William J. Donnelly, Taking Suffering Seriously: A New Role for the Medical
Case History, 71 ACADEMIC MED. 730 (1996). Donnelly suggests that there needs to
be more physician discussion regarding patient's pain and suffering. See id. at 731.
171. Suffering, to the extent that it is recognized as a necessary element of
medical education, is usually associated as an aspect of the care of dying patients.
See generally Annual Medical School Questionnaire from the Liaison Committee on Medical
Education (Part II) (Feb. 14, 1993). A 1992-93 survey by the AMA revealed that only
5 out of 126 medical schools had a separate required course on death and dying.
See id.
172. See infra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
173. A contemporary exception, however, is the AIDS epidemic, which some
religious conservatives insist upon viewing as a plague visited by God upon those
who practice homosexual sex or engage in intravenous drug use. For an excellent
discussion of the concept of plague in the context of AIDS, see SUSAN SONTAG,
AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 44-60 (1988).
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century considered pain in conjunction with its antithesis-pleas-
ure-to be the ultimate basis for all human motivation."' Actual or
anticipated pain generates avoidance behaviors, while actual or an-
ticipated pleasure generates approach behaviors. In the rational-
ism that pervaded Enlightenment thinking, pain was no longer
considered to be, at least in most instances, something that was vis-
ited upon a person. Pain was not an individual's burden to suffer
in dignified silence, but rather something that one could avoid or
curtail by taking appropriate remedial measures. The life of rea-
son involved an evaluation of the benefits and burdens posed by
any course of action on the basis of the pain and pleasure that it
promised.
On this view, the desire to minimize or alleviate suffering
should not be equated with a flight from reality or a denial of a
fundamental aspect of the self. While soul-making of a sort may
take place in the crucible of genuinely intractable pain or unreliev-
able suffering, allowing someone to suffer when relief is available,
at least without their informed consent, might reasonably be viewed
as latently, if not patently sadistic. In the words of William James,
written in 1901:
A strange moral transformation has within the past
century swept over our Western world. We no longer
think that we are called on to face physical pain with
equanimity .... The way in which our ancestors looked
upon pain as an eternal ingredient of the world's order,
and both caused and suffered it as a matter-of-course
portion of their day's work, fills us with amazement.
175
Our attitudes toward pain and the need to endure rather than
to seek relief from it are shaped by non-intellectual forces as well.
We need only look at various aspects of contemporary American
culture to discern that the lives of many persons, particularly young
174. John Locke observed: "Things then are good or evil only in reference to
pleasure or pain;" "Pleasure and pain, and that which causes them, good and evil,
are the hinges on which our passions turn;" "[P]assions are moved by things only
as they appear to be the causes of leasure and pain." 1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Book II, Ch. XX, §§ 2, 3, & 14 (John W.
Yolton ed., 1961).
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adult males, are not governed by a rational hedonism that pursues
happiness by maximizing pleasure while minimizing pain. As one
scholarly study on the subject of pain phrases it: "the American
definition of manhood requires an impassive immersion in
pain.... From boot camp to football practice, we use pain today,
in whatever diminished and misguided ethical sense, to know
whether someone is a man-or to know what kind of man he is."
1 76
Even males who have not allowed themselves to be fully conscripted
into the "Cult of Machismo" nevertheless are encouraged by par-
ents and other role models to minimize any expression of pain.'"
For children of both genders, the parental admonition is to "be-
have like a big girl (or boy) and don't cry," particularly when the
pain they experience is the product of medical ministrations. The
not-so-subde message conveyed is that good children either do not
experience or at least do not express pain, particularly in the con-
text of illness and its medical treatment. To highlight the persis-
tent ambivalence, however, Americans have, at the same time, been
consuming a phenomenal amount of over-the-counter and pre-
scription medications for the relief of a wide variety of physical pain
and mental distress. 79
Such pervasive ambivalent attitudes toward the relief of pain
and suffering go a long way to explaining society's failure to hold
health care professionals responsible for violation of a professional
responsibility to relieve the pain and suffering of patients. There
are clear signs that we now stand on the threshold of a new era of
accountability in this regard. 80 Imposing accountability where it
176. MORRIS, supra note 148, at 181 (1991).
177. For a general discussion of the cultural influences on pain perception
and pain expression, see MARK ZBOROWSKI, PEOPLE IN PAIN 14-48 (1969).
178. See Gary A. Walco et al., Pain, Hurt, and Harm: The Ethics of Pain Control in
Infants and Children, 331 NEw ENG.J. MED. 541, 544 (1994). The bitter irony in this
regard is that until quite recently the medical profession labored under the quite
remarkable myth that children, especially infants, did not have the capacity to
experience pain. See id. As a result, very young children were, and to some extent
still are, the most "at risk" group of patients for undertreated pain.
179. See, e.g., RIcHARD HUGHES & ROBERT BREWIN, THE TRANQUILIZING OF
AMERICA: PILL POPPING AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE (1979); PETER D. KRAMER,
LISTENING TO PROZAC (1993).
180. One among the many indicators is a bill introduced in the Senate under
the name "Conquering Pain Act of 1999." See Conquering Pain Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106, § 941 (1999). Among the features of this proposed legislation is the
recognition that widespread undertreated pain constitutes a major public health
problem, the call for a Surgeon General's report concerning the state of pain and
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has not existed before requires clearly articulated and widely dis-
seminated standards of professional conduct, as well as the underly-
ing principles that support those standards. The following section
examines that important project. s'
VII. THE DUTY TO RELIEVE SUFFERING
A. The Scope of the Duty
It is important to carefully circumscribe the caregiver's respon-
sibility so that deficiencies in performance can be readily identified
and generally free of the critique that the evaluative standard has
been seen too high. First, the suffering at issue is that of the pa-
tient with whom he or she has entered into a professional relation-
ship.18 2 Second, the term suffering as used in this analysis does not
encompass the larger philosophical questions and concerns which
illness and dying engender that are clearly beyond the clinical
competency of the average physician, and which more appropri-
ately fall within the ambit of pastoral care or clinical psychology.
8 3
The focus of this analysis will be on the pain and other forms of
discomfort produced by serious injury and illness, and the suffering
that results from the caregiver's failure to competently and sensi-
tively respond to the patient's plight either directly or through the
mobilization and coordination of other health care professionals.
symptom management in the United States, the confrontation of reimbursement
barriers for effective pain management, public education initiatives, and the
development of provider performance standards in pain and symptom
management. See id.
181. See infra Section VII.A-B.
182. For a philosophical discussion of the duty to relieve suffering in situations
in which there is no special duty-engendering relationship between the sufferer
and those in a position to offer relief, see Susan James, The Duty to Relieve Suffering,
93 ETHics 4 (1982).
183. State-of-the-art palliative care, which in its broadest sense is care directed
toward the relief of pain and suffering engendered by the experience of serious
illness, is generally considered to be a multidisciplinary undertaking. See
AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 91, at 41. For example, the
American Board of Internal Medicine has identified seven components of clinical
competence that are important in providing quality end-of-life care. See id. One
of these components is denominated "Team Approach," and includes an
understanding on the part of the physician that the care of such patients usually
involves not only physicians and nurses, but social services professionals, palliative
care or hospice professionals, pharmacists, chaplains, patient advocates, as well as
the patient's family. See id.
2000]
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Third, this duty is restricted to the types of pain and suffering that
can be relieved or at least ameliorated without causing still greaterS 184
problems for the patient. In other words, considered objectively,
the benefits of applying the means available to relieve a patient's
pain must exceed the risks or burdens.185  As previously noted,
when we explore the reasons offered by caregivers for their failure
to relieve suffering, we encounter many arguments which are based
upon and reflective of an incredible mythology concerning the per-
ils and evils believed to be inherent in the aggressive treatment of
pain. 1  An important question which we must seek to answer is
whether physicians and nurses, as highly skilled and educated pro-
fessionals, can avoid accountability for their failure to relieve pain
and suffering (that as a matter of scientific fact can be safely and
effectively. relieved) on the grounds that they are simply the victims
of prevailing myths from which they have failed to disabuse them-
selves.
B. Potential Sources of the Duty
When conducting an inquiry into the duties of a physician, the
first step (and sometimes last resort) is to consult the Hippocratic
Oath.18  However, for reasons that have been discussed at length
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. An aggressive approach to the relief of severe and persistent pain often,
though not invariably, involves the sustained use of opioid analgesics. A number
of powerful myths about the use of opioids continue to be passed from one
generation of physicians to another, including that sustained use of opioids
invariably leads to addiction (as opposed to physiological dependence), that there
are maximum doses (ceilings) for opioid analgesics which under no circumstances
can be exceeded, and that large doses of opioids invariably lead to respiratory
depression. Each of these beliefs deserves the label of "myth" because there is no
reliable scientific data to support any of them, while solid data to the contrary is
readily available in the medical literature. For a discussion of the process by which
these myths are perpetuated, see C. Stratton Hill, Jr., When Will Adequate Pain
Treatment Be the Norm?, 274JAMA 1881 (1995).
187. The Hippocratic Oath calls physicians to a higher ethical standard than
that of society in general. See C. Everett Koop, Introduction to Dusquene Law Review,
35 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 1 (1996). Koop paraphrases the oath as follows:
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and
judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them. I will not give
poison to anyone though askd to do so, nor will I suggest such a plan....
In purity and in holiness I will guard my life and my art.
Into whatsoever house I enter, I will do so to help the sick, keeping
[Vol. 26:1
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss1/3
PRESCRIPTION FOR PAIN
elsewhere, the fact that the Oath makes no specific reference to the
relief of suffering should not be dispositive of the issue of the phy-
sician's duty in that regard.188 In his seminal article on the relation-
ship between suffering and the goals of medicine, Eric Cassell be-
gins with the assertion that "[t] he obligation of physicians to relieve
human suffering stretches back into antiquity."189 Pain and suffer-
ing often attend injury and illness, and if the physician's charge is
to cure or ameliorate the latter, then doing battle against the for-
mer might reasonably be considered inherent in the process.19° But
the issue is clouded by the fact that both diagnostic and therapeutic
interventions often cause pain-everything from the mild discom-
fort of a vaccination, to the moderate but brief pain when a dislo-
cated limb is reset, to the significant nausea and malaise of chemo-
therapy.'9'
In an attempt to articulate an ethics of pain management for
healthcare professionals, philosopher Rem Edwards argues that
"there is a broadly based humanistic ethics which applies to the
domain of medical care which gives patients a strong prima facie
right to freedom from unnecessary pain . ... "19' The existence of
this right gives rise to three concomitant moral obligations of the
medical practitioner to the patient.9 3 The first is a duty to mini-
mize (physician induced) iatrogenic pain. This means not inflict-
ing additional pain and suffering upon a patient beyond what is an
myself free from all intentional wrong-doing and harm....
Whatsoever in the course of practice I see or hear ... what ought never
to be published abroad, I will not divulge, but consider such things to be
holy secrets.
Id.
188. See, e.g., Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic
Oath, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 77, 91-93 (1993).
189. See Cassell, supra note 4, at 639. Cassell cites no authority for this
proposition, perhaps because to him its validity is self-evident or otherwise
unassailable.
190. See id.
191. The AHCPR clinical practice guidelines for cancer pain contain a
separate section addressing the need to anticipate and effectively manage
procedure-related pain. SeeAHCPR, supra note 121, at 107-14.
192. Rem B. Edwards, Pain and the Ethics of Pain Management, 18 Soc. SCIENCE &
MED. 515, 517 (1984).
193. See id. Edwards does not discuss the theoretical foundations of these
rights and duties, although he maintains that "they can be derived.., from almost
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unavoidable consequence of a reasonable effort to effect a cure.94
The second duty is to be a competent pain management practitio-
ner. This duty requires applying state-of-the-art techniques effec-
tively in order to relieve as much pain and suffering as is possible
without, in so doing, imposing burdens on the patient which ex-
ceed the benefits.19 5  Third, the patient must be adequately in-
formed of the risks and benefits of alternative pain management
strategies, including the "strategy" of not pursuing pain relief.196
Given the well-documented knowledge deficits about pain relief of
many health care professionals, there exists a legitimate question
whether many currently possess the ability to fully and accurately
inform patients about available techniques and therapies and their
respective risks and benefits. 97 For example, even in what would
seem to be the most straightforward of clinical situations, pain re-
lief for a patient with terminal cancer, one commentator con-
cludes:
American doctors regularly refuse to prescribe effective
doses of narcotic painkillers to dying patients on the
grounds that the patients might become addicted. The
194. See id.
195. This is a duty that can reasonably be placed on all physicians who care for
patients with pain, and not one that is reserved for specialists in pain management
and/or palliative care. For example, it is the position of the World Health
Organization that pain control and palliative care should not belong strictly to
pain control specialists. See Jan Sternsward et al., The World Health Organization
Cancer Pain and Palliative Care Program: Past, Present, and Future, 12 J. PAIN & SYMPT.
MGMT. 65, 68 (1996).
It is time for pain control/palliative care to be incorporated into existing
systems of care and for physicians most likely to see chronically ill
patients in the first line of duty (general practitioners, oncologists) to
make pain control and palliative care a part of their routine clinical
practices.
Id.
196. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Pain and Symptom Control: Patient Rights and
Physician Responsibilities, 10 HEMATOL/ONCOL CLINICS OF N. AM. 41, 47 (1996).
The commentator states, "[a]s a part of the process of informed consent,
physicians also have an obligation to ensure that patient's refusal of pain
management or palliative care is not based on incoherent, inconsistent, and
irrational beliefs." Id.
197. For a discussion of the risk/benefit analysis for opioid analgesics, see
Seddon R. Savage, Long-term Opioid Therapy: Assessment of Consequences and Risks, 11
J. PAIN & SYMPT. MGMT. 274 (1996).
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treatment of cancer pain, clearly, is still not based solely
on scientific fact but draws on ignorance, fear, prejudice,
and on an invisible, unacknowledged moral code
expressing half-baked notions about the evil of drugs and
the duty to bear affliction.
198
Further,
If significant numbers of clinicians are unable to make the
most basic and fundamental distinction between
addiction and physiological dependence on opioid
analgesics for the relief of severe pain, then they are
unlikely to be able to competently perform an appropriate
risk/benefit analysis among alternative modalities of
treatment and the default position of admonishing the
patient to endure the unrelieved pain.199
The current statements of the ethical principles governing
clinical practice clearly states the duty to relieve suffering. For ex-
ample, the American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics
states in pertinent part, "[p]hysicians have an obligation to relieve
pain and suffering and to promote the dignity and autonomy of dy-
ing patients in their care. This includes providing effective pallia-
tive treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten death."20°
While this provision specifically mentions dying patients,01 it is dif-
ficult to imagine a legitimate basis for limiting the physician's duty
to relieve pain and suffering to terminal patients. Furthermore,
the American Nursing Association's Position Statement on relief of
198. MoRIS, supra note 148, at 192.
199. Id. A new debate has just recently developed over the extent to which it is
fair and reasonable to hold physicians accountable for their lack of up-to-date
knowledge and skills in the assessment and management of pain. One school of
thought, which is more consistent with the arguments made in this article, is that
professionals (including physicians) have a duty to continue their education
throughout their professional life, in order to practice consistent with advances in
science and technology. The other school of thought, which seems to have arisen
solely in the context of challenging the pain management practices of physicians,
maintains that it is unduly harsh to take physicians to task when they were never
educated properly (about pain assessment and management strategies) in medical
school and residency training. See Dick Merrit et al., Last Acts Coalition, State
Initiatives in End-ofLife Care: Policy Guide for State Legislatures, April 1999, at 6-7.
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pain in dying patients provides:
Nurses should not hesitate to use full and effective doses
of pain medication for the proper management of pain in
the dying patient. The increasing titration of medication
to achieve adequate symptom control, even at the expense
of life, thus hastening death secondarily, is ethically
justified.
20 2
The AMA Code also addresses another issue that has arisen in
the debate over the nature and extent of the physician's profes-
sional responsibility to relieve pain and suffering. The issue is
whether physicians should be insulated from ethical or legal re-
sponsibility for undertreating pain because their medical education
in this area was demonstrably inadequate. 3 The AMA's Principles
of Medical Ethics states, "[a] physician shall continue to study, ap-
ply and advance scientific knowledge, make relevant information
available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consulta-
tion, and use the talents of other health professionals when indi-
cated."2 4 The suggestion that a professional cannot be charged
with possessing any knowledge or skill that was not covered as part
of their basic education and training directly contradicts funda-r • 1 • 201
mental principles of professionalism.
In justifying their opposition to physician-assisted suicide legis-
lation, the AMA and the ANA have relied heavily on the argument
that dying patients who receive appropriate pain management and
202. AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, COMPENDIUM OF POSITION STATEMENTS ON
THE NURSE'S ROLE IN END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS 7 (1992) (including the position
Statement on Promotion of Comfort and Relief of Pain in Dying Patients).
203. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 200, at 40.
204. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 200, at xiv.
205. Among the current opinions of the AMA on Professional Rights and
Responsibilities is the following:
CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION. Physicians should strive to further
their medical education throughout their careers, for only by
participating in continuing medical education (CME) can they continue
to serve patients to the best of their abilities and live up to the
professional standards of excellence. Fulfillment of mandatory state
CME requirements does not necessarily fulfill the physician's ethical
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palliative care rarely request medical assistance in ending their
lives.2°6 This argument illegitimately presumes that most, if not all
requests for medical assistance in dying come from patients with
uncontrolled pain.2° However, a more important point is that
there is a developing consensus among health care professionals
that the failure to either effectively manage pain that can be man-
aged, or to refer the patient to a professional who can bring state-
of-the-art techniques to bear on the problem, constitutes both a
breach of professional ethics and a departure from an emerging
standard of care.°8
The concept of a legal right of patients to effective manage-
ment of their pain and the correlative duty on the part of caregiv-
ers, particularly physicians because of their virtual monopoly on the
authority to prescribe narcotics, to provide effective pain manage-
ment to their patients, has barely begun to emerge in the last dec-
ade.2 ° In a much earlier work on the legal rights of the critically ill,
John Robertson answers the question "[d]oes a patient have the
right to receive effective medication for pain?" with "probably
not." ° The basis for this reply is that physicians need only comply
206. See, e.g., Paul Wilkes, The Next Pro-Lifers, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 21,
1996.
207. A report on the first year of experience under Oregon's physician-assisted
suicide law questioned whether "patients request lethal prescriptions because of
inadequate care at the end of life?" and concluded:
We found that... patients were significantly more likely... to have
expressed concern to their physicians about loss of autonomy and loss of
control of bodily functions.... Thus, the decision to request and use a
prescription for lethal medications during the first year of legalized
physician-assisted suicide in Oregon was associated with views on
autonomy and control, not with fear of intractable pain or concern about
financial loss.
Arthur E. Chin, et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: The First Year's
Experience, 340 NEw ENG.J. MED. 577, 582 (1999).
208. See, e.g., Nathan I. Cherney & Raphael Catane, Professional Negligence in the
Management of Cancer Pain, 76 CANCER 2181 (1995).
209. One of the first commentators to seriously discuss poor pain management
as an example of medical malpractice was Canadian legal scholar and bioethicist
Margaret Sommerville. See, e.g., Margaret A. Sommerville, Death of Pain: Pain,
Suffering, and Ethics, in PROGRESS IN PAIN RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 41 (G.F.
Gebhart, et al. eds., 1994); Margaret A. Sommerville, Pain and Suffering at the
Interfaces of Medicine and Law, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 286 (1986).
210. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 15 (Norman
Dorsen ed., 1983). Robertson notes that doctors have an obligation to provide
2000]
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with the prevailing standard of care, and since it is abundantly clear
that "doctors have traditionally failed to alleviate pain," it would be
very difficult for the patient/plaintiff to establish that her under-
treated pain constituted a departure from the applicable standard
of care."' What Robertson fails to consider is the implications of
the fact that the medical profession's failure to adopt and consis-
tently apply readily available therapeutic modalities which would
improve patient care presents pricisely the type of situation that is
ripe for judicial standard-setting. Particularly when deficiencies in
the prevailing custom and practice are so clearly inconsistent with a
traditionally recognized goal of the profession, courts are likely to
feel an irresistible impulse to do as they have done in the past, and
find the entire profession to be negligent. In the words of Judge
Learned Hand:
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the
general practice of the calling the standard of proper
diligence.... Indeed, in most cases reasonable prudence
is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its
measure; a whole calling may have lagged in the adoption
of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests,
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end
say what is required; there are precautions so imperative
that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
212omission.
In the next section, reasons and explanations that are usually
offered for the failure of physicians to adequately manage pain are
213discussed. Judge Hand's language, and more recent case prece-
dent, cast a long and ominous shadow over the legal defensibility of
current medical practice in the area of pain management.
214
Professor Robertson presciently notes that "[a]s more atten-
tion is paid to the effective management of chronic pain.., a
patients with the treatment that other doctors would customarily provide to
manage pain, even though the doctors have often failed to alleviate pain. See id.
211. See id.
212. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (citation omitted). The
device in question in this case was a functioning radio for receiving current
weather reports, the absence of which contributed to the loss of a barge being
towed by the tug in question. See id. at 739.
213. See infra Section VIII.A-E.
214. See infra Section IX.E.
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medical standard of care assuring critically ill patients effective pain
relief may be established. 21' The final section will discuss the clini-
cal practice guidelines promulgated by the Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research (AHCPR) and their appropriateness as a na-
tional standard of care for the treatment of pain. 6 For purposes of
this section, what is significant about the guidelines is that among
other things they purport to recognize, or to reaffirm, a profes-
sional responsibility to provide effective pain relief.
217
The material in Section I121 establishes at least a prima facie
case that if there is a duty to provide effective pain relief whenever
it is indicated and feasible, then in most clinical settings that duty is
breached more often than it is fulfilled.2 '9 If we assume, as we
should, that most persons enter the health care professions with
genuinely beneficent motivation, then we must seriously explore
the most plausible explanations for this breach, and the extent to
which they should be considered genuine mitigating factors.
VIII. REASONS WHY THE DUTY TO RELIEVE PAIN IS BREACHED
A. Barriers to Effective Pain Management
The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research discusses
barriers to effective pain management in its cancer pain guide-
lines.220 The barriers are divided into three categories: problems
related to health care professionals, problems related to patients,
and problems related to the health care system.nl The first cate-
215. ROBERTSON, supra note 210, at 15.
216. See generally AHCPR, supra note 121.
217. The acute pain management guidelines state, "[h]ealth care is both a
technical and an ethical enterprise. The ethical obligation to manage pain and
relieve the patient's suffering is at the core of a health care professional's
commitment." AHCPR, supra note 121, at 4. Similarly, the cancer pain guidelines
include the following statement: "The obligation to alleviate suffering is an
essential component of the clinician's broader ethical duties to benefit and not
harm; it dictates that health professionals maintain clinical expertise and
knowledge in the management of pain, even when present educational programs
do not provide this." Id. at 10.
218. See supra Section II.
219. While it is estimated that pain can be safely and effectively relieved in
90% of all patients, the evidence indicates that pain is not relieved in 80% of
patients. See Betty R. Ferrell & Michelle Rhiner, High-Tech Comfort: Ethical Issues in
CancerPain Management for the 1990s, 2J. CIN. ETHICS 108, 108 (1991).
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gory includes the following sub-categories: inadequate knowledge
of pain management, poor assessment of pain, concern about regu-
lation of controlled substances, fear of patient addiction, concern
about side effects of analgesics, and concern about patients becom-
ing tolerant to analgesics. These sub-categories can be organized
around two basic themes-lack of knowledge and clinical and regu-S 223
latory concerns about narcotics.
B. Lack of Knowledge Regarding Pain Assessment and Pain Management
We must carefully distinguish between the non-existence of
knowledge regarding a particular subject matter and the failure to
acquire and apply available knowledge. Perhaps the primary impe-
tus for the promulgation of clinical practice guidelines for pain as-
sessment and management is that the recent studies discussed ear-
lier in this article so clearly demonstrate that many health care
professionals lack, or fail to apply, basic knowledge and skills in this224
area. The neuro-physiological, biochemical, and pharmacologi-
cal facts upon which the guidelines are based are readily available
225to all health care professionals. Consequently, the epidemic of
undertreated pain is not the product of the limitations of medical
science per se; rather, it stems from widespread ignorance and fear
among health care professionals. This ignorance of pain assess-
ment and pain management techniques and strategies has been, to
some extent, cultivated. 6 This becomes an important point when
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. The AHCPR is not the only organization which has promulgated clinical
practice guidelines for pain assessment and management in response to the
widespread problem of undertreated pain. For other such guidelines, see
AMERICAN PAIN SOCIETY, QuALrTY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR RELIEF OF AcuTE PAIN
AND CANCER PAIN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH WORLD CONGRESS ON PAIN (1991);
AMERICAN PAIN SOCIETY, PRINCIPLES OF ANALGESIC USE IN THE TREATMENT OF AcuTE
PAIN AND CHRONIC CANCER PAIN: A CONCISE GUIDE TO MEDICAL PRACTICE (1989);
American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines for the Elective Use of Conscious Sedation,
Deep Sedation, and General Anesthesia in Pediatric Patients, 76 PEDIATRICS 317, 317-21
(1985); National Institutes of Health, The Integrated Approach to the Management of
Pain, 2J. PAIN& SYMPT. MGMT. 35 (1987).
225. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
226. For this charge to be sustainable, one must make the case that
professionals have some minimal responsibility to stay current in the literature of
their profession that pertains to their type of practice. Therefore, one must be
able to persuasively maintain that if a health professional cares for patients in pain,
then she is implicitly charged with a responsibility to be conversant with the
[Vol. 26:1
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss1/3
PRESCRIPTION FOR PAIN
we consider potential legal liability for the failure to relieve pain,
since ignorance of what is required to adequately care for a patient
has never been a recognized defense to a medical malpractice
claim.
22 7
If pain were a rare phenomenon in the clinical setting, which
only a few physicians encountered in a small number of patients,
there would be no legitimate basis for concern. Of course, the real-
228 thity is quite to the contrary. It is the rare health care professional
who does not encounter patients with pain on a regular basis. This
basic fact of clinical practice makes the failure to educate health
care professionals in state-of-the-art pain assessment and pain man-
agement even more indefensible.
current clinical literature on assessing and managing pain, and dealing
appropriately with the side-effects or other problems associated with the preferred
modalities of treatment. If the relevant (and current) clinical literature is replete
with authoritative studies and guidelines which state, for example, that it is
exceedingly rare for a patient to become addicted to the opioid analgesics that
have been prescribed to manage their pain, then a practitioner who continues to
deny opioid analgesics to their patients with pain on the grounds that they are
concerned about the risk of addiction can justly be accused of having cultivated
their ignorance of both the risk of addiction and/or the prevailing distinction
between physiological dependence and addiction. A similar line of argument can
be made with regard to those clinicians who steadfastly undermedicate their pain
patients on the grounds that they have reached the ceiling on that particular
analgesic. See Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with
Narcotics, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED., 123, 123 (1999); Wanzer et al., supra note 99, at
847.
227. A typical general articulation of the knowledge required of a physician is
that "[e] ach physician may with reason and fairness be expected to possess or have
reasonable access to such medical knowledge as is commonly possessed or
reasonably available to minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or
general field of practice throughout the United States. . . ." Hall v. Hilbun, 466
So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis added). As will be discussed in another
section of this article, while it may be the case that the level of knowledge and the
standard of practice for pain management among physicians is remarkably low,
that lack of knowledge and low standard of practice is not likely to offer a
legitimate defense to a patient's malpractice claim grounded upon failure to
manage pain given the wealth of information "reasonably available" to all
physicians. See infra Part X.
228. Based upon the most reliable data, it was estimated that in 1988 one-
quarter of the population of the United States experienced moderate to severe
pain that required significant therapeutic interventions such as opioid analgesics.
See John J. Bonica, Pain Research and Therapy: History, Current Status and Future
Goals, in ANIMAL PAIN 2 (Charles E. Short & Alan Van Poznak eds., 1992).
229. The absence of any formal pain curriculum in the schools that train
health care professionals is not for lack of positive suggestions by skilled
professionals. See, e.g., Issy Pilowsky, An Outline Curriculum on Pain for Medical
20001
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C. Concerns About Narcotics-The Phenomenon of Opiophobia
Any discussion of the care of patients with serious pain and the
concerns that it engenders with physicians should include certain
caveats. First, the use of narcotics to manage pain or treat any
other medical condition, as with medical and surgical procedures
generally, involves inherent risks.2 ° Consequently, the responsibil-
ity of the clinician is to be able to knowledgeably assess the poten-
tial risks and benefits of any given intervention and to communi-
cate those to the patient so that he or she may then provide an
informed consent or refusal. With regard to the relief of pain,
perhaps more than other medical interventions, the patient is in
the best position to determine how much pain she is willing or able
to endure in order to avoid the real (as opposed to the mythical)
risks of any particular pain relief modality.
Second, as the clinical practice guidelines make clear, state-of-
the-art pain management is multifaceted, and rarely should be
based exclusively on opioid analgesics.2 s' Therefore, pharmacol-
ogical approaches include opioid and non-opioid (adjuvant)
drugs. s2 Nonpharmacological pain management techniques in-
clude physical and psychosocial interventions.233 While the most se-
vere and persistent types of pain, such as that involving terminal
cancer, usually require large and sustained doses of opioid analge-
sics as a part of the therapeutic regimen, there may be excep-
234
tions.
Schools, 33 PAIN 1 (1988); Pain Curriculum for Basic Nursing Education, ASP
NEWSLETrER, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 4-6; International Association for the Study of
Pain ad hoc Committee on University Courses and Curricula, Curriculum Outline on
Pain for Pharmacy Students, IJ. PHARM. CARE IN PAIN & SYMPT. CONTROL 45 (1993).
230. A "risk of the procedure" is one which has some statistical possibility of
arising as a result of a medical intervention that is performed within the standard
of care. See AHCPR, supra note 121, at 50-51, 61-65. In the case of pain
management, the risk of any intervention should be assessed on the reasonable
assumption that it will be provided in a nonnegligent manner. See id. The risk so
assessed and so disclosed, should then be balanced by the patient, in consultation
with the health professional, against the risks or burdens of alternative strategies as
well as doing nothing. See id. Part of the mythology surrounding pain
management is that there are no risks to the patient in the undertreatment or
nontreatment of pain. See id.
231. SeeAHCPR, supra note 121.
232. See supra notes 235-40.
233. See supra notes 235-40.
234. A compelling example is described by novelist, Reynolds Price, a victim
of cancer of the spinal cord. See REYNOLDS PRIcE, A WHOLE NEW LIFE 149-60
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With this background, let us consider the phenomenon that
has come to be characterized as "opiophobia."15 As the term has
come to be used, opiophobia denotes an unreasonable fear of and
resultant reluctance to prescribe, administer, or receive opioid an-
236algesics, even for the relief of severe pain which is unresponsive
to other available pain management strategies.3 7 While the phe-
nomenon of opiophobia is not unique to American culture, the
openly declared war on drugs by American politicians and bureau-
crats has produced a particularly virulent form of it in this coun-
try.2 8 A detailed examination of the psycho-social, cultural, and po-
litical forces underlying American opiophobia is beyond the scope
of this article, and is readily available in other sources.239 However,
the intricacies and interrelationships between federal and state laws
regulating the prescribing of opioid analgesics have been repeat-
edly identified as one of the more significant barriers to the provi-
240sion of effective pain management and palliative care.
(1994). Price ultimately found relief from excruciating pain only when he
abandoned the pharmacopeia of powerful drugs that had been prescribed and
underwent hypnosis and biofeedback. See id.
235. Although it is unclear who first used the term "opiophobia," a number of
highly regarded specialists in the field of pain management and palliative care
have utilized it without hesitation as an apt description of attitudes and behaviors
of both patients and physicians. Indeed, the term has even been applied to similar
populations of laypersons and professionals in Europe. See, e.g., John P. Morgan,
American Opiophobia: Customary Underutilization of Opioid Analgesics, 11 ADV. PAIN
RES. & THERAI'Y 181; M. Zenz & A. Willweber-Strumpf, Opiophobia and Cancer Pain
in Europe, 341 THE LANCET 1075 (1993) (describing incident of physician refusing
to issue more due to the drug's addictive qualities).
236. The major group of drugs used in cancer pain management are called
opioid analgesics. See Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions
Involving the Care of the Dying, 26J.L. Med. & Ethics 308, 310 (1992). The term
"opioid" is a general term that describes naturally occurring and semisynthetic
drugs derived from the juice of the opium poppy and completely synthetic drugs.
See id.
237. See id.
238. For an account of opiophobic behaviors on the part of Canadian
physicians, see Sommerville, Death of Pain: Pain, Suffering and Ethics, supra note
209, at 43-44.
239. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 115.
240. The Policy Studies Division of the Pain Research Group at the University
of Wisconsin Medical School is at the forefront of initiatives devoted to
understanding the impact of narcotics law and regulation on physician prescribing
practices and the formulation of reform measures to enhance the quality of care
of patients with pain. For an example of their work in this area, see David E.
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1. The Regulatory Milieu
The oversight of the prescribing practices of physicians takes
place at both the federal and state levels. The authority which pro-
vides the primary regulatory basis for the narcotics used in pain re-
lief are the Uniformed Controlled Substances Act24' and the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2a2 The former is administered
by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) .24' The FDA
evaluates and approves drugs before they can be available for
medical use.2" It also provides information to consumers regard-
ing drugs.245
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act divides such drugs
246into five different schedules. Schedule I substances are described
as "those that have no accepted medical use in the United States
and have a high abuse potential."2 47  Among the examples of
Schedule I substances listed by the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) are heroin, marihuana, LSD, peyote, and mescaline.248
Schedule II substances are considered to have a high abuse poten-
tial plus "severe psychic or physical dependence liability."249 Among
the examples of Schedule II substances are some of those most fre-
241. See UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCEs AcT § 101 (1994).
242. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
243. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Frequently Asked Questions (visited
Dec. 4, 1999) <http://www.fda.gov/opacom/faqs/genfaqs.html>.
244. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Drug Information (visited Dec. 4,
1999) < http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug.htm>.
245. See id.
246. See UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 201-212 (1994).
247. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, PHYSICIAN'S MANUAL 3 (1990).
248. See id. The characterization of some of these substances as having "no
accepted medical use" is controversial. For example, recently Arizona passed
referenda allowing physicians to prescribe "medicinal" marijuana to patients
suffering from severe pain. SeeJeffrey Allan Kilmark, Government Knows Best? An
Analysis of the Governor's Power to Veto and the Legislature's Power to Repeal or Amend
Voter Enacted Intitiative and Referendum Petitions in Arizona, 30 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 829, 829
(1998).
249. See id. The precise connotation of the term "liability" is unclear. Perhaps
it is intended to be synonymous with "risk" or "potential." Of course, when
crafting a PHYSICIAN's MANUAL in an era of escalating malpractice litigation, it is
difficult to imagine a more negatively charged word than "liability." While
technically speaking the "liability" to which the PHYSICIAN'S MANUAL refers may be
that of the patient rather than the prescribing physician, even this suggestion is
misleading. When the alternative is severe and persistent pain, being
physiologically dependent upon opioid analgesics that are effective in relieving
that pain may not constitute a "liability" to the patient.
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quently used for pain management: morphine, meperidine
(Demerol), oxycodene (Percodan), and fentanyl (Sublimaze).250
The failure of the DEA Physician's Manual to more carefully distin-
guish among "psychic dependence," "physical dependence," and
"addiction" is unfortunate and potentially quite misleading. Ex-
perts in pain management sometimes refer to addiction as "psycho-
logical dependence" in order that it not be confused with the
physical dependence, which can be expected to accompany signifi-
cant, sustained doses of narcotic analgesics administered to control
severe pain.2 5' As one noted pain specialist has observed, "[t] here is
a deeply held fear that the long-term exposure to an opioid can
create an addiction disorder that could become a problem more
significant than the chronic pain that originally justified the ther-
apy."212 This "deeply held fear" is part of the mythology underlying
opiophobia, and it survives despite overwhelming scientific evi-
dence that the incidence of addiction among patients who receive
opioid analgesics for purposes of pain management is no more
than ten percent.253 Schedule III-V substances are characterized by
254decreasing potential for abuse. Unlike Schedule II substances,
physicians may issue prescriptions for them orally or in writing, and255
may authorize refills. Schedule II substances, by contrast, can
only be prescribed in writing, and may not be refilled.256
The impact of the DEA's policies and procedures, as well as
those of state medical licensing boards, upon the prescribing prac-
tices of physicians in caring for patients with pain are noteworthy.
The DEA disclaims any intent to discourage the appropriate use of
controlled substances by physicians to deal with the genuine medi-
250. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 247, at 3.
251. The AHCPR's MANAGEMENT OF CANCER PAIN defines addiction as a
"[p]attern of compulsive drug use characterized by a continued craving for an
opioid and the need to use the opioid for effects other than pain relief." See
AHCPR, supra note 121, at 185.
252. Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Current
Status, 1 PROG. PAIN RES. & MGMT. 247, 263 (1994).
253. See id. See, e.g., Porter &Jick, supra note 226.
254. See UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 410 (1994).
255. See id.
256. There is a provision for an emergency telephone prescription order for a
Schedule II substance, but it must be limited to the amount needed to treat the
patient during a bona fide emergency period, and within 72 hours the physician
must provide the pharmacy with a written and signed prescription order. See
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 247, at 13.
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• 257
cal needs of their patients. In the DEA's words: "[c]ontrolled
substances have legitimate clinical usefulness and the prescriber
should not hesitate to consider prescribing them when they are in-
dicated for the comfort and well-being of patients."258 Nevertheless,
it also "strongly endorses" the Multiple Copy Prescription Program
259(MCPP) administered by a number of states. Sometimes referred
to as "triplicate forms," and designed to deter the illegal diversion
of controlled substances, the MCCP has been identified as one of
the most significant barriers to effective pain management in states
where it is used.26° The DEA's mission is to strongly discourage261
drug diversion to illicit uses. There is no other federal agency
with the charge of insuring that drug control laws and regulations
do not, in the words of one prominent pain management expert,
Kathleen Foley, "[make] people with pain the victims of the war on
drugs."
262
The states exercise a parallel authority to prohibit the non-
medical use of controlled substances. Most state statutes are based
upon the 1970 model Uniform Controlled Substances Act.263 The
definitional language in some of these statutes, however, reflects
the prevalent inability (or unwillingness) to appropriately distin-
guish psychological and physiological dependence, and between
addiction and tolerance. For example, the New York State Con-
trolled Substances Act defines an addict as "a person who habitually
257. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, supra note 247, at 3.
258. See id. at 24.
259. See id.
260. In the Report of the Summit on Effective Pain Management convened by
the Governor of California in 1994, the state's triplicate prescription system was
decried as "outdated, impractical for many modem health care settings, and
generally ineffective for monitoring and controlling diversion of medications for
nontherapeutic purposes." See Report, Summit on Effective Pain Management:
Removing Impediments to Appropriate Prescribing 8 (1994). Indeed, the administrative
complexities and "implied intimidation" of the system had caused nearly fifty
percent of California physicians to decline to apply for privileges to prescribe
Schedule II medications. See id.
261. See U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA
Mission Statement (visited Dec. 4, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/mis-
sion.htm>.
262. See Dick Merrit et. al., supra note 199, at 3. The statement is attributed to
Kathleen Foley, M.D., former director of Pain and Palliative Care Services at
Memorial-Sloan Kettering Cancer Center and director of the Project on Death in
America. See id.
263. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS:
UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (1970).
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uses a narcotic drug and who by reason of such use is dependent
thereon."264 That statute prohibits physicians from prescribing con-
trolled substances to an "addict" unless that person is a patient of
265the physician and is suffering from an incurable and fatal disease.
Manifestly, current thinking among pain management specialists is
that patients with severe chronic pain can only be effectively man-
aged through the long-term administration of opioid analgesics are
not addicts. 66 This is regardless of whether their pain is of malig-
nant or nonmalignant origin, and regardless of the fact that they
might be described as "habitual users" and may well be physically
267dependent upon certain narcotics for control of their pain.
Nonetheless, a narrow and rigid interpretation of such statutory
language would likely preclude a physician from effectively control-
ling the chronic pain of patients whose condition could not be la-
beled terminal.
In recent years a number of states have begun to address the
problems posed by statutory language such as that in New York.
The remedy of choice thus far has been the enactment of so-called
"Intractable Pain" statutes. One such statute defines intractable
pain as "pain for which, in the generally accepted course of medical
practice, the cause cannot be removed and otherwise treated."
2'
The statute goes on to provide that in undertaking to treat a pa-
tient for intractable pain, "a physician may prescribe or administer
264. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAw § 3302(1) (McKinney 1993).
265. See id.
266. See e.g., Foley, supra note 59, at 7-10.
267. In a 1989 article, the Executive Director of the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, the nation's leading agency for drug abuse research, noted that "the
confusion between the use of narcotics by legitimate patients and the use of
narcotics by street addicts influences the attitudes and behavior of dispensing
practitioners, patients and their families, as well as government policymakers who
regulate the availability of these drugs." Charles. R. Schuster, Does Treatment of
Cancer Pain with Narcotics Produce Junkies?, 11 ADv. IN PAIN REs. & THERAPY 1, 1
(1989). He concluded the article, the title of which he chose to highlight the
absurdity of the question, with the reassurance that those in his agency:
recognize our special responsibility to make sure that, in our attempt to
reduce drug abuse, we articulate clearly the differences between those for
whom narcotics are appropriately prescribed to treat unnecessary
suffering and the drug addicts whose narcotics use is the central and
destructive focus of their lives.
Id. at 3.
268. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.326(1) (West 1995).
20001
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any controlled substance under Schedules 1I-V... provided the
physician does so in accordance with that level of care, skill, and
treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent physician under
similar conditions and circumstances." 69 These statutes have had
very limited impact on the prescribing practices of physicians. For
example, four years after enacting its version of an intractable pain
statute, California recognized the need for a Pain Summit to ad-
dress the persistent undertreatment of pain by physicians in the
state.27° Florida, with its intractable pain statute in place, attempted
unsuccessfully to discipline a physician who treated patients with
severe chronic pain by prescribing opioid analgesics.271
The monitoring of physicians' prescribing practices that are
ostensibly within the scope of their clinical practice (as opposed to
the diversion or illicit use that the DEA pursues) at the state level is
usually conducted by medical licensing boards. These boards are
charged with the responsibility for investigating complaints against
physicians for unprofessional practice. These investigations may
involve anything from physician drug addiction and alcoholism
that impair the ability to practice, to sexual involvement with pa-
tients, to practicing other than allopathic me . 2 72dens, o  an lp icmedicine. When the
DEA's investigation of a physician's prescribing practices for con-
trolled substances reveals no diversion or illicit use, it is customary
to refer such cases to the appropriate state medical licensing board
to determine whether those practices nevertheless constitute un-
professional practice. 273 Recent studies like the one discussed below
indicate that such oversight by state licensing boards has a pervasive
and profoundly negative impact upon the treatment of severe
chronic pain by physicians.
The publication American Medical News conducted a survey and
received responses from its physician readers from thirty-two
269. Id. at § 458.326(3).
270. See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 292-309 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 835 (N.C. 1990), in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary action taken by the state board.
See id. Dr. Guess, in a few cases in which allopathic approaches had failed, offered
trials of homeopathic remedies to patients. See id. The board found that such
practices did not "conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical
practice in the State of North Carolina." Id.
273. See Testimony of Michael Mapes, Diversion Program Manager, DEA
Denver Division, before Interdisciplinary Task Force on Intractable Pain of the
Colorado General Assembly (September 10, 1996).
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states.274 A majority of the respondents acknowledged that the po-
tential for disciplinary action by their state medical board caused
them to be so conservative in their prescribing practices for pa-
tients with chronic, intractable pain that their patients might not be
receiving adequate pain relief.2 75 Such behaviors raise profound
moral questions, or so it seems to an objective observer from out-
side the medical profession. David Morris with such an objective,
non-clinician perspective, is one of the very few commentators to
seriously question and express concern about the ethical myopia
that appears to afflict the medical profession and those who regu-
late it, at least on the issue of providing effective and readily avail-
able pain relief. In one of the strongest statements in print, he de-
clares that "not relieving pain brushes dangerously close to the act
of willfully inflicting it."2 76 The willful infliction of pain is torture,
which is foreclosed to the government by the Eighth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, even in the punishment of convicted
criminals as "cruel and unusual."277 Why then, do such practices fail
to raise so much as an ethical ripple when documented in the
medical literature?2 78 Could it be, as David Morris recently inti-
mated, that the voices of those in pain, and perhaps also those who
would decry the failure of physicians to properly attend to it, have
been silenced by "the neglect of a biomedical culture in which
complaints of pain (subjective and unverifiable) simply do not mat-
ter. 
2 79
One ethicist suggests that in their enculturation into medicine,
physicians are induced to indulge in two types of "forgetting" with
regard to pain.280 One type is "psychological" forgetting, which oc-
curs when the physician distances him or herself from the pain of
illness and of the diagnostic and therapeutic procedures which pa-
tients must be induced to undergo.2 81 Inherent in this process of
discounting the level and the experiential quality of such pain is
274. See Flora J. Skelly, Fear of Sanctions Limits Prescribing of Pain Drugs, 37 AM.
MED. NEWS 19 (1994).
275. See id.
276. MoRRIS, supra note 148, at 191.
277. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
278. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 33.
279. See MORRIS, supra note 148, at 134.
280. See William Ruddick, Do Doctors Undertreat Pain ?, 11 BIOETHICS 246, 247-49
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the idea that pain in the clinical setting is often unavoidable and
that it certainly cannot and should not become the obsessive focus
of either the physician or the patient.282 The second type of forget-
ting is "conceptual." 283 Traditionally, pain is a symptom of some
underlying condition that the physician is charged with diagnosing
and curing.2 Thus pain, and more specifically how it is experi-
enced and described, provides important information to the physi-
cian, information that would be lost (or so the argument runs) if
the pain were promptly and effectively alleviated.285 Such palliative
measures would also divert the physician from the primary task of
286
effecting the diagnosis and undertaking curative measures.
There is also the antiquated but curiously persistent notion that the
Hippocratic admonition primum non nocere (first do no harm) trans-
lates into an admonition not to prescribe strong narcotics just to
make a patient more comfortable. According to this view, the ad-
verse side effects, or the mythical perils of addiction and its result-
ing stigmatization, are presumed to outweigh the patient's contin-
ued suffering, even for those who are near death.28 An often-
282. See id. at 247.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 24849.
286. This traditional approach to patient care has at long last been critiqued.
Pellegrino, for example, argues that "[p]alliative care is fundamentally good
comprehensive care, and it should be part of the care of all patients .... "
Pellegrino, supra note 99, at 1522.
287. The AHCPR clinical practice guidelines for the management of cancer
pain directly confront such antiquated notions in the following terms:
Clinicians are often concerned that high doses of opioids used for
palliation may harm or kill a patient, particularly when doses are further
increased to alleviate pain.... When the patient's death is imminent
because of the progression of primary disease, an increased risk of earlier
death counts little against the benefit of pain relief and a painless death.
The ethical duty to benefit the patient through relieving pain is itself
adequate to support increasing doses to alleviate pain, even if there
might be life-shortening and expected side-effects.... The person dying
from cancer should not be allowed to live out life with unrelieved pain
because of fear of side effects; rather, appropriate, aggressive palliative
support should be given.
AHCPR, supra note 121, at 64. In order to understand just how much against the
traditional grain of medical education and practice such admonitions run, one
need only note the remarkable similarity between the above-quoted language and
that found in an article on the undertreatment of pain published over 20 years
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repeated medical nostrum is that "nobody ever died of pain."
2 8
These "explanations," along with the previously discussed "bar-
riers" to effective pain relief, fail to take into account the funda-
mental ethical principle that ultimately it is for the victim, not the
perpetrator, to determine what constitutes harm. The suggestion
implicit in the psychological and conceptual "forgetting" thesis,
that it is too much to ask physicians to empathize with and minister
to their patients in pain, is bogus. 9 Physicians who cannot relate
to their patient's pain and suffering by listening and compassion-
ately responding lack essential clinical competencies required to
practice their chosen profession.2 °
The performance of one state medical licensing board demon-
strates the legal, ethical, and clinical implications of its scrutiny of
the prescribing physicians' practices. Physicians' fears of discipli-
before:
Some degree of physical dependence and tolerance develops whenever a
narcotic is given in therapeutic dosage over a prolonged period, but in
patients with painful terminal illnesses such considerations should not in
any way prevent the physician from fulfilling his primary obligation to
ease the patient's discomfort. The physician should not wait until the
pain becomes agonizing: no patient should ever wish for death because of his
physician's reluctance to use adequate amounts of potent narcotics.
Marks & Sachar, supra note 40, at 181. Over 20 years separate these two powerful
expressions of the same ethical admonition to physicians. One may reasonably ask
why the medical profession is so resistant to calls for beneficence.
288. The implication is that patients have died, or had their lives shortened, by
drug overdoses, but not by severe, persistent pain. However, the current view
among palliative care specialists is that the risks posed by aggressive pain
management strategies have been greatly exaggerated and are not based on
objective, verifiable, and scientifically sound data. Furthermore, severe,
uncontrolled pain not only destroys a patient's quality of life, but can produce its
own set of adverse sequelae, some of which might be sufficiently serious to
contribute to a patient's earlier demise. See AHCPR, supra note 121, at 8.
289. The American Board of Internal Medicine Special Report on physician
competency in end-of-life care includes as an essential element of effective pain
assessment: "Believe the patient's complaint of pain." AMERICAN BOARD OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 91, at 15. Elsewhere in the same report, among the
core competencies for physicians who care for patients with pain are "listening,
comforting, compassion, courtesy, and sensitivity to patient's needs for comfort
and dignity." See id. at 41.
290. See MORRIS, supra note 148, at 264. David Morris articulates this view in
the following terms: "Doctors who neglect to gain the skills and knowledge
required for clinically effective listening-although this idea is absolutely foreign
to Western medicine-are engaged in unethical medical practice." Id.
2000]
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nary action for less than ultra conservative practices in prescribing
opioid analgesics for patients in pain are not without foundation in
fact.29' In a recent Florida case, the Florida Agency for Health Care
Administration (AHCA) filed an administrative complaint against
292Dr. Hoover, a physician board-certified in internal medicine.
The complaint alleged inappropriate and excessive prescribing
practices of Schedule II controlled substances to seven patients.293
A hearing officer held that the agency had failed to meet its burden
of proof on all charges. 94 The AHCA's Board of Medicine rejected
the hearing officer's recommended findings as to five of the seven
patients whose care was under review and imposed a reprimand,
fine, mandatory continuing medical education, and two years of
295probation upon the physician.
Dr. Hoover, who represented herself in these proceedings, ap-296
pealed the Board's action, which was reversed on appeal. The
appellate court, in a sternly written opinion, criticized the Board's
"draconian policy of policing pain prescription practice [s] .,"29 The
basis of the court's reversal was that the Board had "once again en-
gaged in the uniformly rejected practice of overzealously supplant-
ing a hearing officer's valid findings of fact regarding a doctor's
prescription practices with its own opinion in a case founded on a
woefully inadequate quantum of evidence."298
Given the numerous references in this article to the clinical
practice guidelines of the AHCPR, one aspect of the appellate
court's reversal is particularly pertinent to this analysis.2 The ap-
pellate court ruled that the hearing officer had properly consid-
ered the AHCPR guidelines for the management of cancer pain in-
troduced into evidence at the hearing through an expert witness
291. Several other recent cases against physicians that have been prosecuted
either under civil or criminal law for pain management practices; however, in
these cases prosecutions were later overturned. See Hollabaugh v. Arkansas State
Med. Bd., 861 S.W.2d 317 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Schade, 30 Cal. App. 4th
1575 (1994); In reDiLeo, M.D., 661 So. 2d 162 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
292. See Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
293. See id.
294. See id. at 1382.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 1385.
298. Id. at 1381.
299. See id. at 1383.
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for Dr. Hoover.3 00 The hearing officer found that the clinical prac-
tice guidelines were probative on the issue of Dr. Hoover's treat-
ment of severe, chronic non-cancer pain.!"' The hearing officer
further found the guidelines corroborated the expert testimony
that Dr. Hoover's prescribing practices were within the standard of
care. "2 The Board of Medicine had accepted the AHCA's excep-
tion to this finding of fact by the hearing officer on the grounds
that the AHCPR guidelines pertained to cancer pain, whereas Dr.
Hoover's patients suffered from chronic nonmalignant pain. 
°
*
One possible justification for the hearing officer's reliance on those
particular guidelines (in the absence of guidelines on chronic
nonmalignant pain) is that in addressing pain in AIDS patients, the
authors of the guidelines (an interdisciplinary panel of experts in
pain management and palliative care) state:
Pain is a symptom commonly experienced by patients with
HIV infection, even in the absence of an opportunistic
cancer.... The principles of pain assessment and
treatment in the patient with HIV positive/AIDS are not
fundamentally different from those in the patient with
cancer and should be followed for patients with HIV
positive/AIDS.
30 4
The clear implication is that some types of chronic noncancer pain
can and should be treated in the same way as cancer pain.
The second revealing and disturbing aspect of the treatment
of Dr. Hoover by the Florida medical board, which also may have
prompted some of the vitriol that appears in the appellate court's
opinion, is the selection of the two expert witnesses called by the
AHCA in presenting its case. 5 Neither had examined any of the
patients or patient records in formulating their opinion that Dr.
Hoover's care was unprofessional.3 °6 They relied solely on com-




303. See id. at 1382-83.
304. AHCPR, supra note 121, at 139.
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Dr. Hoover had prescribed . Still more disconcerting, both of
these "experts" acknowledged that they did not treat chronic pain
patients, but always referred those patients to other physicians.0 s
Nevertheless, both deemed themselves, and were deemed by the
AHCA and the Board, qualified to opine that Dr. Hoover had pre-
scribed excessive, if not lethal doses of narcotics to these patients,
and thereby had practiced below an acceptable standard of care.
This case illustrates an important point about the professional
struggle to raise the standard of care for pain management, i.e., the
educational process must begin with the administrative agencies
that regulate physicians. The record thus far suggests that many
boards are themselves afflicted with the same prejudices, fears,
myths, and misinformation about the use of narcotics for pain re-
lief as those whom they regulate. This suggestion was confirmed by
a recent survey of state medical licensing board members, which
revealed significant knowledge deficits regarding the principles
and practices of state-of-the-art pain management.310 In responses
by nearly half of the nation's 627 state medical board members to a
1991 survey on knowledge of and attitudes toward pain manage-
ment practice, forty-three percent believed that most cancer pa-
tients receive adequate pain relief while five percent are of the
opinion that most cancer patients are overmedicated. 311 In the
307. See id.
308. See id. at 1382.
309. See id. Since these "experts" had never seen any of the seven patients or
even troubled to review their medical records, they were not in a position to know
that not only had none of them suffered any adverse consequences from these
potentially "lethal" doses, but each had benefited from Dr. Hoover's care and
treatment of their chronic pain. See id. at 1381.
310. See David E. Joranson, et al., Opioids for Chronic Cancer and Non-Cancer Pain:
A Survey of State Medical Board Members, 79 FEDERATION BULLETIN 15 (June 1992).
311. See id. at 28. The fact that not all state licensing boards are predominantly
comprised of members with such inaccurate views is demonstrated by the
following language in guidelines recently promulgated by one state licensing
board:
The CBME (Colorado Board of Medical Examiners) firmly believes that
physicians have a duty to provide maximal comfort levels and alleviate
suffering in their dying patients in a skillful and compassionate manner.
The Board is concerned that fear on the part of physicians may result in
ineffective pain control and unnecessary suffering in terminal patients.
COLORADO BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, GUIDELINES FOR PRESCRIBING
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR INTRACTABLE PAIN 1 (1996).
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same survey, forty-seven percent of the respondents reported that
although prescribing opioid analgesics for chronic, intractable,
non-cancer pain was not technically illegal, it should be discour-
aged.12  Seventy-one percent defined addiction (incorrectly) as
313physical or psychological dependence. These statistics are trou-
blesome for a number of reasons. First, they indicate a failure or
refusal on the part of board members to read the voluminous lit-
erature of their own profession documenting the widespread un-
dertreatment of pain. Second, these licensing board members
seem to be declaring that it is better for patients with a form of
chronic, nonmalignant pain, which can be relieved only through
the administration of opioid analgesics, to continue to suffer,
rather than authorize broader use of these drugs.
2. Must a War On Drugs Preclude a War on Pain?
As a matter of federal public policy, the United States has been
waging a war on drugs for decades through both Republican and1 • • • 314
Democratic administrations. This war is purportedly being
fought only against the illicit importation, distribution and con-
315sumption of narcotics for non-therapeutic purposes. The rheto-
ric promulgated by the publicists of this war generally fails to take
note of the fact that what is not being condemned and criminalized
is the appropriate medical use of narcotics for therapeutic and pal-
316liative purposes.
312. SeeJoranson, supra note 310, at 33.
313. See id. at 30. More enlightened and progressive boards, such as the one in
Colorado, take the position that: "The prescribing of opioid analgesics for patients
with intractable non-cancer pain may also be beneficial, especially when efforts to
remove the cause of pain or to treat it with other modalities have been
unsuccessful." COLORADO BROAD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, supra note 311, at 1. On
the issue of addiction, that Board declares: "Physical dependence and tolerance
are normal physiologic consequences of extended opioid therapy and are not the
same as addiction.... Patients with chronic pain should not be considered
addicts merely because they are being treated with opiates." Id. at 3.
314. For a detailed account of the early history of America's war on drugs, see
DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973).
For background on the recent, openly declared "war on drugs," see DOUGLAS N.
HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS (1992).
315. See generally Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and
the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1396 (1993).
316. For example, in a 1996 statement Secretary of Health and Human
Serivces Donna Shalala declared that: "a clear message must be sent to all
Americans that drugs are dangerous and wrong." See Eric E. Sterling, Drug Policy:
2000]
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Prominent figures such as the first "drug czar" William
Bennett, have suggested that drugs are the single greatest threat to
the moral fabric of American society.3 7 This reflects a powerful
public perception, to which the medical profession has not been
immune. It suggests that narcotics are at best a necessary evil that
should be employed as infrequently and sparingly as possible lest
the medical community as prescribers be morally and legally re-
sponsible for creating addicts .3' The phenomenona of opiophobia
and the war on drugs feed upon each other and explain why physi-
cians have, in many instances, been so quick to label a chronic pain
patient's persistent search for relief as illegitimate "drug-seeking
behavior" as opposed to what it more often is-legitimate pain re-
lief seeking behavior.3 9 Characterizing a patient's chronic pain as
illegitimate implicitly makes the claim that expressions of persis-
tent pain are not genuine. Such physician behavior may also con-
stitute an effort to blame the victim of substandard care. Pseu-
doaddiction is an iatrogenic syndrome in which the
undertreatment of pain actually engenders conduct on the part of
320patients that is similar to those who are addicted. It also suggests
that prescribing narcotic analgesics (or increasing the dosage of
those already prescribed) would have no legitimate therapeutic
A Smorgasbord of Conundrums Spiced by Emotions Around Children and Violence, 31 VAL.
U. L. REV. 597, 645 (1997), citing Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Statement at Press Conference to Release Monitoring the Future
Survey (Dec. 19, 1996) (transcript on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).
317. See WILLIAM BENNETr, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 9 (1990).
318. See David F. Musto, Physicians'Attitudes Toward Narcotics, 11 ADV. PAIN RES.
& THERAPY51, 59 (1989).
319. Several contributing and interrelating factors are at work here. First, by
labeling a person's pursuit of effective pain relief as mere "drug-seeking behavior,"
the physician essentially denies them the status of patient, thereby ostensibly
absolving themselves of any further professional responsibility to respond to the
individual's needs. Second, physicians are simply following the admonitions of
medical boards and drug regulation agencies when they distance themselves from
such persons, who threaten to cast the pall of "script doctor" on their practice.
Third, offering the appearance of being liberal in the prescribing of opioid
analgesics virtually guarantees regulatory scrutiny, whereas offering the
appearance of being unduly conservative in one's prescribing practice virtually
guarantees obscurity if not invisibility. There are no reported instances of a
physician having been reported by a pharmacist or investigated by the DEA for
being a chronic underprescriber of opioid analgesics. See, e.g., James R. Cooper et
al., Prescription Drug Diversion Control and Medical Practice, 268JAMA 1306 (1992).
320. See generally David E. Weissman &J.D. Haddox, Opioid Pseudoaddiction-An
Iatrogenic Syndrome, 36 PAIN 363 (1989).
[Vol. 26:1
56
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss1/3
PRESCRIPTION FOR PAIN
purpose, but would only be responding (inappropriately) to the
patient's actual or incipient addiction or drug abuse."' The pre-
sumption of innocence and the right to due process are hallmarks
of the American criminal justice system. Therefore, our society
maintains that it is better that ninety-nine guilty persons go free
than that one innocent person be wrongly convicted. Conversely,
the hallmark of the regulatory system for prescribing Schedule II
narcotics appears to be that it is better that ninety-nine patients
with genuine pain continue to suffer than that one drug-seeking
individual obtain a prescription to which he or she is not entitled.
In justification of this strong claim, consider the situation in Colo-
rado.
The Colorado Prescription Drug Abuse Task Force, promul-
gates "guidelines" for health care professionals with prescribing
authority for Schedule II narcotics. These guidelines constitute
what might be characterized as a "draft notice" that every health
care professional in Colorado with prescribing authority has been323 ..
conscripted into the war on drugs. The guidelines begin with the
following language:
The abuse of prescription drugs, especially controlled
substances, is a serious social and health problem in
Colorado and the United States. As a health professional,
you share responsibility for solving the prescription drug
abuse and diversion problem.
* Your social responsibility is to uphold the law and help
protect society from drug abuse.
* Your professional responsibility is to prescribe
controlled substances appropriately, guarding against
abuse while assuring that your patients have medication
321. Too many physicians approach patient complaints of pain, even patients
with terminal illness, with skeptism. Because of this, public policy on drug control
directly clashes with emerging standards of medical ethics. In the words of one
prominent physician in the movement to improve pain management and palliative
care, Susan Tolle: "Pain and suffering are subjective symptoms, hence it is only the
patient who can tell us about the quality and quantity of his pain." Melissa L.
Buchan & Susan W. Tolle, Pain Relieffor Dying Persons: Dealing with Physicians'Fears
and Concerns, 6J. CLjIcAL ETHICS 53, 58 (1995).
322. See generally COLORADO PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE TASK FORCE, COLORADO
GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR HEALTH
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available when they need it.
* Your personal responsibility is to protect your practice
from becoming an easy target for drug diversion, which
could result in legal actions against you and damage your
professional esteem.
4
Absent from this document is any acknowledgement of the
major public health problem posed by the epidemic of under-
325treated pain. There is also no mention of the physician's ethical
responsibility to relieve the pain and suffering of patients by con-
scientiously providing opioid analgesics as needed in the fulfill-
ment of that responsibility.3 26 This ancient duty is lost in the rheto-
ric about preventing drug abuse and avoiding "damage [to]
professional esteem."
32 7
While it is certainly in the public interest to prevent the diver-
sion of drugs from therapeutic to non-therapeutic purposes, it is
also in the public interest to protect vulnerable patients. This may
be done by insuring that those who are afflicted with painful condi-
tions do not suffer unnecessarily because physicians fail to pre-
scribe appropriate amounts of narcotic analgesics. Yet, when con-
sidering the behavior of many state medical licensing boards, there
is a very one-sided approach. Despite factual evidence suggesting
that there are many more physicians who underprescribe narcotic
analgesics for their patients, than there are physicians who divert
drugs for illegal purposes, prior to 1999, there had not been a sin-
gle reported case in which a licensing board has taken disciplinary
action against a physician for allowing patients to suffer unneces-
sarily.328 However, there is a plethora of reported cases in which li-





327. The most recent version of these guidelines, which is still in draft form as
of this writing, does acknowledge the existence of the Colorado Board of Medical
Examiners Guidelines on pain management, but fails to suggest how the very
different points of emphasis of the two sets of guidelines might be reconciled. See
COLORADO PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE TASK FORCE BOARD, COLORADO GUIDELINES
OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS WHO PRESCRIBE (4th ed. forthcoming 1999).
328. But see, e.g., SUPPORT, supra note 63.
329. See infra notes 330-349 and accompanying text.
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In 1999, the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners became the
first state medical licensing board to take disciplinary action against
a physician for the failure to provide appropriate pain relief
330
Paul A. Bilder, M.D., a 52-year old pulmonary specialist, was
charged with six counts of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct
and gross or repeated acts of negligence in his care of gravely ill or
dying patients. In each instance, he had failed or refused to pro-
vide opioid analgesics, which were necessary to relieve terminal
pain or to properly sedate a patient who was undergoing intuba-
tion.332 Dr. Bilder entered into a stipulated order with the Board in
which he acknowledged the deficiencies in his care of these pa-
tients and agreed to complete the one-year Physicians Evaluation
Education Renewal (PEER) program during the next year, as well
333as course on physician-patient communication. Finally, he must
continue working with a psychiatrist who will provide the Board
334with regular reports throughout the next year.
Another recent case, this one in California, demonstrates how
conflicted state medical boards have become on the issue of pain
management in clinical practice. In July of 1994, the California
Medical Board issued a formal statement on "Prescribing Con-
trolled Substances for Pain Management. " 335 This statement fol-
lowed a year of testimony at hearings held by the Board's Task
Force on Appropriate Prescribing and a day long "Summit on Ef-
fective Pain Management: Removing Impediments to Appropriate
Prescribing" sponsored by then California Governor Pete Wilson. 36
In the statement, the Board acknowledged "that pain, whether due
to trauma, surgery, cancer and other diseases, is often under-
treated" and that "[u]nrelieved pain has a harsh and sometimes
disastrous impact on the quality of life of people and their fami-
lies."37 The Board then stated "[p]ain management should be a
high priority in California" and "principles of quality medical prac-
330. Erin Hoover Barnett, Case Marks Big Shift in Pain Policy, THE OECoNiAN,
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tice dictate that citizens of California who suffer from pain should
be able to obtain the relief that is currently available." 38 In con-
junction with this statement the Board issued "Guidelines for Pre-
scribing Controlled Substances for Intractable Pain," which in-
cludes the following general admonition:
The Board strongly urges physicians to view pain
management as a priority in all patients.... Pain should
be assessed and treated promptly, effectively and for as
long as the pain persists. The medical management of
pain should be based on up-to-date knowledge about
pain, pain assessment and pain treatment.
33 9
Four years after the statement and guidelines were issued, Bev-
erly Bergman filed a complaint with the Board following the pain-
ful death of her father from cancer. 0 Bergman was protesting the
undertreatment of her father's pain by his doctor, Dr. Win Chin. 41
Following an investigation of the complaint, the Board wrote to
Bergman in August of 1998, stating that although "pain manage-
ment for your father was indeed inadequate," no disciplinary action
would be taken against the physician. 2
Responses to the California Board's refusal to take any disci-
plinary action against a physician who allows a dying patient to suf-
fer severe pain reflect two quite disparate viewpoints. David Joran-
son and June Dahl,3" both affiliated with the Pain and Policy
Studies Group of the University of Wisconsin, take the position that
it would be "unduly harsh" to punish physicians for failure to apply
knowledge and skills their training never afforded them. 5 Susan
Tolle' 4 6 Joanne Lynn,347 and Kathleen Foley34 8 take the position that
338. Id.
339. Id. at 8.
340. See Stolberg, supra note 98, at Fl.
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See Merrit et al., supra note 199, at 6.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See supra note 321.
347. See Stolberg, supra note 98, at Fl.
348. See supra note 262 (response to question from the audience, Department
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medical boards should treat the substandard practice of pain man-
agement in the same manner as they treat any other form of sub-
standard or unprofessional practice and take appropriate discipli-
nary action.
One commentator has suggested this one-sided approach by
state medical licensing boards to physician prescribing practices-
obsession with the potential for overprescribing, indifference to
numerous examples of underprescribing-sends a strong and dis-
turbing message that unrelieved pain is "irrelevant to the discipli-
nary board."39 The Board's inaction regarding doctors' substan-
dard practice and direct violation of officially adopted clinical
practice guidelines, as in the California case, suggests that such
guidelines can be ignored with impunity and without risk of sanc-
tion. It is, of course, too early to discern whether it is the Oregon
or the California boards that will provide the models for other state
boards. One possible explanation for the disparate treatment is
that the Oregon board had six reported cases attributable to the
same physician, thereby constituting persuasive evidence of a pat-
tern and practice of unprofessional or negligent conduct, whereas
the California board had only one case upon which to justify disci-
plinary action.
D. The Low Priority of Pain Relief in the Health Care Setting
The fact that maximally effective pain management has not
traditionally been a priority, even in hospitals where pain is most
likely to occur in the context of serious illness, has not been seri-
ously contested. °50 Why it is not a priority is a question still in
search of an answer. A few partial explanations follow. One is that
the hospital culture is profoundly influenced by the medical staff,
and physician ambivalence toward the aggressive relief of pain has
permeated our exploration of the barriers. Medicine's indifference
to pain and suffering can be seen, in part, as a reflection of its focus
on human physiology and the disease process, and its concomitant
relegation of the personhood of the patient to another dimension
that is not one of its major responsibilities. 1 This dichotomy also
349. See C. Stratton Hill, Jr., Government Regulatory Influences on Opioid Prescribing
and Their Impact on the Treatment of Pain of Nonmalignant Origin, 11 J. PAIN & SYMPT.
MGMT. 287, 293 (1996).
350. See supra note 50.
351. According to some critics of modem medicine, not only the personhood
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helps to explain the tendency of physicians to distinguish between
"real pain," pain that is commensurate with objective, physiological
findings of tissue damage, and "unreal pain," pain which is of psy-
chogenic origin or the fictional account of a malingering or drug-
seeking patient.3 52 Such attitudes are artifacts of the hegemony of
the curative model of medicine discussed in Section V. Only when
a patient has been clinically "certified" to be within six months of
death and care has been formally transferred to hospice, will the
palliative model be allowed to make control of their pain a prior-
ity.n3 Another aspect of this phenomenon is that many therapeutic
medical interventions actually cause pain. Hence, when a patient
seeks medical treatment, they are, or so it might be presumed, con-
senting to the pain or discomfort inherent in the treatment modali-
ties that are indicated.3 4 Reports of pain by the patient are usually
viewed as data to be dutifully recorded in the progress notes of the
medical record and utilized in the assessment of the patient's un-
derlying condition and response to therapeutic interventions.
Complaints of pain, only secondarily, will be deemed to create an
imperative for prompt and effective management of the pain.
This is particularly the case when the patient's complaints of pain
lie outside of expected pain trajectories for a particular condition.
Indeed, it is not unusual for patients with an atypical trajectory to
be labeled "uncooperative" or "difficult."3 56 Ongoing complaints of
pain may actually be interpreted by clinicians as a failure or refusal
to appreciate their therapeutic efforts, thereby further antagoniz-
ing the staff and isolating the patient.3 57 Thus, well before the era
of the patient, but the threat of death from severe or terminal illness can be
reduced or "deconstructed" into a series of manageable biomedical problems,
such as the stabilization of blood pressure, pulse, and respiration. See MORRIS,
supra note 148, at 237.
352. See Mariet A. E. Vrancken, Schools of Thought on Pain, 29 Soc. SCIENCE &
MED. 435, 436 (1989).
353. For a discussion of the referral process to hospice, see DENICE C. SHEEHAN
& WALTERB. FORMAN, HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE 11-19 (1996).
354. See FAGERHAUGH & STRAUSS, supra note 49, at 19-20.
355. One aspect of the new movement to promote institutionalization of a
commitment to effective pain management is the regular charting of pain as "the
fifth vital sign" along with such other vital signs as temperature, pulse, respiration
and blood pressure. See Betty R. Ferrell et al., An Institutional Commitment to Pain
Management, AM. PAIN Soc. BULLETIN, Apr.-May 1994, at 16.
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of cost containment and managed care,"" the behaviors of clini-
cians, particularly in the acute care setting, suggested a belief that a
choice had to be made between treating a medical condition and
alleviating pain and suffering. This widely held belief also provides
an explanation for the unique success of hospice in making the
gravely ill and dying comfortable. Hospice has no curative agenda.
Since its patient population is wholly comprised of those who are
acknowledged to be dying, the focus can legitimately be narrowed
to pain relief, symptom management, and meeting the patient's
and family's psychosocial needs.5 9
E. Reasons Do Not Equal Excuses-Moral Courage and the Duties of
Caregivers
The barriers to appropriate pain management considered in
this section provide plausible reasons why so many patients experi-
ence undertreated pain. Too many clinicians are ignorant of effec-
tive pain assessment techniques and pain management strategies,
indifferent to the persistent pain of their patients, fearful of regula-
tory scrutiny of their prescribing practices, and confused about im-
portant concepts such as addiction (psychological dependence),
physical dependence and tolerance. Collectively, these barriers
have caused, or at the very least contributed to, an enduring epi-
demic of pain and suffering that untreated pain leaves in its wake.
358. It is probably too early to draw any firm conclusions about the ultimate
impact of cost containment considerations and managed care on the provision of
quality pain relief. For an analysis of some of their issues and implications, see
Diane E. Hoffman, Pain Management and Palliative Care in the Era of Managed Care:
Issues for Health Insurers, 26 J.L., MED. & ETHics 267 (1998); Timothy S. Jost, Public
Financing of Pain Management: Leaky Umbrellas and Ragged Safety Nets, 26J.L., MED. &
ETHics 290 (1998).
359. A point of clarification is important here. Hospice is a setting in which
optimal palliative care is routinely provided. The clinical goals of hospice, in
general, are not distinguishable from the goals of palliative care as they have been
articulated by organizations such as the American Board of Internal Medicine. See
AMERIcAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 91, at 41. Hence there is no
absolute barrier to the provision of palliative care in an acute care hospital that is
of comparable quality to that provided in the best of hospice settings. Rather, the
barriers are institutional and economic.
360. There are also patient-related barriers to good pain management. The
general public too is both ignorant and fearful of opioid analgesics, and reluctant
as patients to be viewed as demanding of more in the way of care than has been
offered. One can hardly expect lay persons to be more knowledgeable and
sophisticated about an emerging aspect of clinical practice than health care
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But none of these factors, individually or collectively, rises to the
level of an excuse for this deficiency in clinical practice. Health
care professionals, physicians and nurses in particular, claim to
have as one of their fundamental ethical norms and professional
goals the principle of beneficence-taking positive steps to help
those with whom they have a professional relationship. While cur-
ing disease when possible is an indisputable goal of health care, as
well as ameliorating symptoms of chronic disease for which there is
no cure, caring for both the curable and the incurable conditions
that afflict persons is a concomitant professional responsibility. 61
However, it is one, which has been reaffirmed by the medical estab-
lishment only recently, when its back was up against the wall with
regard to care of the dying.62
professionals. For a discussion of these patient-related barriers, see Charles S.
Cleeland, Documenting Barriers to Cancer Pain Management, in CURRENT AND
EMERGING ISSUES IN CANCER PAIN: RESEARCH AND PRAcTICE 321, 325-327 (C.R.
Chapman & Kathleen M. Foley eds., 1993); Joseph J. Fins, Public Attitudes About
Pain and Analgesics: Clinical Implications, 13 J. PAIN & SYMPT. MGMT. 169 (1997).
361. In 1996, a distinguished international panel of health care professionals
assembled by the Hastings Center issued a report on the goals of medicine, in
which the panel sought to articulate the values at the core of medicine which must
inform policymakers in undertaking health care reform. See International Project
of the Hastings Center, The Goals of Medicine: Setting New Priorities, in HASTINGS
CTR. REP. SI (Nov.-Dec.1996). The goals of medicine were identified as:
The prevention of disease and injury and promotion and maintenance of
health.
The relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies.
The care and cure of those with a malady, and the care of those who
cannot be cured.
The avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a peaceful death.
Id. What is striking about the goals as stated is the remarkable balance between
the curative and the palliative approaches to patient care, strongly suggesting that
the hegemony of the curative model that is the hallmark of modern medical
education and practice reflects a medical ethos that is inconsistent with medicines
core values.
362. A prominent palliative medicine specialist provides a powerful narrative
from early in his clinical training. See Charles F. Von Gunten, Why IDo What IDo,
in AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, CARING FOR THE DYING: IDENTIFICATION
AND PROMOTION OF PHYSICIAN COMPETENCY, PERSONAL NARRATIVES 47-48 (1996).
This case exemplifies what has been the prevailing attitude of the medical
profession with regard to patients with intractable suffering, i.e., "there is nothing
to do," and hence no professional responsibility to acquire knowledge, develop
skills, or change attitudes toward these most challenging and distressing patients
and their need for compassionate care. See id.
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The groundswell of public support that has resulted in the pas-
sage of a physician-assisted suicide referendum in the state of Ore-
gon, 63 and the near passage of similar laws in the states of Califor-
nia and Washington, has been driven in significant part by a
growing public awareness of medicine's acknowledged failures in
the care of gravely ill and dying patients. Because the public has
At 9:00 pm on a bitter cold, wintry Chicago night I received a page from
an ENT [ear, nose and throat] resident. He was admitting a young man
with head and neck cancer to my service who was "endstage" and
expected to die. He said there was "nothing to do." As I was
overwhelmed by new admissions, a large clinical service, and had not yet
learned to cope with the VA [Veternans Administration] system where I
was a new intern, I saw the patient last. When I arrived in his room at
about 2:00 am, he was alone. His head was the size and shape of a
pumpkin due to edema. He was restless and short of breath and he
looked terrified. Because his tongue was swollen, he couldn't talk. I
didn't know what to do for him, so I patted him on the shoulder, said
something inane and left and at 7:00 am he died.
The memory haunts me because now I know I could have helped him
feel better in many ways. I failed to care for him properly because I was
ignorant of palliative medicine. If I am known as a doctor who
specializes in the care of the dying, then maybe a frightened,
overwhelmed intern will know to call me for help rather than walk away
because he mistakenly thinks there is "nothing more that can be
done. .. I want there to be a lasting impact of this branch of medicine
upon contemporary medical practice as a whole. The physician scientist
model of the modern physician is too limited in scope. At a fundamental
level, I think this model of medical care is responsible for the disaffection
and anxiety that the public has about their medical care.
Id.
363. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
364. Two articles authored by large numbers of prominent physicians
acknowledge these deficiencies. In the earlier of the two, 12 distinguished
physicians state:
One of the most pervasive causes of anxiety among patients, their
families, and the public is the perception that physicians' efforts toward
the relief of pain are sadly deficient. Because of this perceived
professional deficiency, people fear that needless suffering will be
allowed to occur as patients are dying. To a large extent, we believe such
fears are justified.
Wanzer et al., supra note 99, at 847. The second article, authored by the very long
list of principal investigators in the SUPPORT study, concluded:
The picture we describe of the care of seriously ill or dying persons is not
attractive. One would certainly prefer to envision that, when confronted
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tended to give the medical profession the benefit of the doubt,
people have erroneously assumed that physicians are relieving the
pain and suffering of serious illness as effectively as the current
state of medical science and technology permits. If so much suffer-
ing continues to permeate the dying process, then the only hu-
mane response is to empower physicians to provide lethal doses of
narcotics when a competent, terminally ill patient requests them in
order to escape unbearable pain and suffering. The response of
the AMA and similar professional groups has been to affirm the
professional responsibility of physicians to relieve suffering to the
fullest extent possible, and to acknowledge that state-of-the-art pain
management and palliative care enables physicians to do a much
365better job in this area than in fact they are doing. However, what
is not directly acknowledged either by the AMA or by state medical
licensing boards is that if medical ethics demands that physicians
provide effective pain relief, yet studies show that many physicians
do not, then what we are confronted with is not merely a clinical
failure, but an ethical one as well. Medicine is intrinsically a moral
and humanistic undertaking. Persistent and widespread failure to
relieve pain that can be relieved raises fundamental ethical ques-
tions (whether or not they are acknowledged) about the character
of such practitioners.36 Lamentably, such questions are rarely, if
ever posed, not even by those in the burgeoning field of biomedical
ethics, whose primary role is presumably to be acutely sensitive to
the ethical nuances of clinical practice.367 Instead, the discussion
immediately turns to the barriers to effective pain management,
rather than to the question of why so many physicians lack the
moral courage to rise above those barriers and address the unnec-
essary suffering of their patients. It is not the absence of modalities
with life-threatening illness, the patient and family would be included in
discussions, realistic estimates of outcome would be valued, pain would
be treated, and dying would not be prolonged.
SUPPORT, supra note 63, at 1597.
365. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES ON
QUAITY CARE AT THEENDOF LIFE 12 (1995).
366. For an extensive exposition of the role of virtue in medicine, see EDMUND
D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MEDICAL PRACTICE (1993).
For a discussion and critique of virtue-based ethics in medicine, see TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP &JAMESF. CHILDRESS, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 62-69 (4th ed. 1994).
367. For a critique of the failure of bioethics to confront the ethical
implications of undertreated pain, see Rich, supra note 33.
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of pain relief that causes the problem, it is the failure of will on the
part of too many physicians to resist opiophobic forces that would
condone, or at least tolerate suffering rather than resort to pre-
scribing the high dosages of narcotics that many of the gravely ill
and dying may require.
The recounting of these barriers has become not only tedious
but also pernicious in the sense that they have come to be treated
like artifacts of the natural world, as inevitable and immutable as
the progression of the seasons or the order of the planets in the so-
lar system. Quite the contrary, as the preceding analysis has shown,
these barriers are the product of an opiophobic culture and a cura-
tive model of medicine that have long tolerated unnecessary pain
and suffering in the clinical setting. Rather than continuing the
rhetoric of the last quarter century that speaks of scaling these bar-
riers, with no accountability on the part of the health care system
for reform, we should design strategies for eradicating them which
entails the active involvement of the medical profession as a whole.
Nothing would bring these long-standing barriers down more
quickly then a concerted effort on the part of organized medi-
cine.36
368. In case it may appear that too much blame is being laid upon the
profession of medicine, a few points must be emphasized. First, physicians control
the content of the medical school curriculum and all aspects of residency training
programs, as well as the bodies which accredit both and prepare the examinations
that measure physician competency. Also, physicians often control the medical
licensing boards in the states, which are the primary means by which the
prescribing practices of physicians are assessed. Finally, through the organized
medical staff of the hospital, physicians have significant if not controlling
influence on the quality of care patients receive. If the physicians on the
curriculum committee, the licensing board, or the medical staff wished good pain
management to become a priority in medical education and patient care, it is hard
to imagine what could stand in the way of the much needed reform measures
which they chose to initiate.
369. By way of example and not limitation, the following are a few modest
proposals that would demonstrate a serious intent to bring about change: 1)
medical schools could be required, in order to maintain their accreditation, to
institute a pain curriculum designed to insure that no student obtains an MD
degree who does not possess the core competencies identified by the American
Board of Internal Medicine and the American Medical Association Education of
Physicians in End-of-Life Care Project; 2) medical licensing boards could
uniformly adopt the Model Pain Management Guidelines of the Federation of
State Medical Licensing Boards, and in turn be required to ascertain that each of
their licensees possesses the knowledge, skills and attributes necessary to comply
with such guidelines; 3) hospitals could be required, in order to maintain their
JCAHO accreditation, to demonstrate that they have promulgated, implemented,
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David Morris, one of the remarkably few authors to suggest
that there are profound ethical questions underlying the failure or
refusal to relieve pain when the means to do so are readily avail-
able, arrives at the following conclusion:
The ethics of pain management, unfortunately, may not
receive proper attention until the first doctor is
successfully sued for failing to provide adequate relief. At
that point, the need for a full and reflective dialogue on
ethical questions about pain will be preempted-as so
often happens in American life-in favor of the slowly
grinding mills of the law.37
Two critical points are inherent in Morris's suggestion, one
obvious and one subtle. The more obvious point is that litigation,
and more particularly medical malpractice liability, changes physi-
cian behavior. 71 The more subtle point is that medical jurispru-
dence, particularly medical malpractice litigation, has the power to
shape ethical perceptions and ethical practices in medicine. The
next section considers the development of the doctrine of in-
formed consent, which provides a paradigm case of medical juris-
prudence (malpractice liability) transforming both medical prac-
tice and principles of medical ethics. While the evolution of
informed consent has been copiously documented from a legal. 372
perspective, the implications of that evolution for medical ethics
and monitored compliance with a set of policies, procedures and protocols
designed to insure that effective pain management has been made a priority in
patient care, and that physicians and nurses on the staff will be held accountable
for adhering to them.
370. MORRIS, supra note 148, at 192.
371. Physicians surveyed in one major study believed that the malpractice
threat was important in maintaining compliance with the standard of care. See
REPORT OF THE HARvARD MEDICAL PRACTIcE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
PATIENTS, DocToRs, AND LAWYERs: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 9-24 (1990); see also Peter A. Bell, Legislative
Intrusions in the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect
of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939, 975-90 (1984) (examining the
psychological affect of tort sanctions on physicians' behavior). But see Stephen D.
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985) (proposing
arguments in favor of doing away with tort law liability).
372. See RuTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
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have not."'3 It is first necessary to understand, through the example
of informed consent, the potent transformative influence of law on
the ethics of clinical practice. We can then follow Morris's lead and
inquire into the possibility that the emerging standard of care in
the area of pain management and palliative care may provide a new
basis upon which to challenge physicians (as well as other licensed
health care professionals) who continue to allow patients to suffer
from undertreated pain.74 In this way the law can shape clinical
practice to an extent that moral suasion and admonition has failed
to accomplish . 75
373. Curiously, two books that purport to recount and analyze the influence of
law on bioethical decisionmaking fail to consider the doctrine of informed
consent in clinical practice (as opposed to clinical research) and its emergence in
the crucible of medical malpractice litigation. See ROGER B. DwORKrN, LIMITS: THE
ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING (1996); DAviD J. ROTHMAN,
STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAw AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED
MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991).
374. It is interesting to note that among the voluminous responses to the
SUPPORT study, only one written by an attorney-bioethicist proposed a solution to
the problems revealed that would hold physicians legally accountable for their
persistence. In pertinent part, the proposed remedial measures include the
following:
Medical licensing boards must make it clear to licensees that painful
deaths are presumptively ones that are incompetently managed and
should result in license suspension or revocation in the absence of a
satisfactory justification. Another reasonable step is to establish a system
of not-for-profit public interest health care law firms whose sole mission is
to promote patient rights by educating the public and the medical
community about those rights, and by bringing lawsuits on behalf of
patients whose rights are not honored in the hospital setting.... Lawyers
are likely to get the ear of physicians who have been deaf to the pleas of
patients, families, and nurses.... And to the extent that law continues to
dominate medical ethics in the United States, changes in the ethical
behavior of physicians will continue to require legal action.
George J. Annas, How We Lie, 25 HASTINGS Cm. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, at S12, S13-
S14.
375. In subtly alluding to the impotence of ethical entreaties to physicians to
attend more carefully and diligently to the pain and suffering experienced by
patients, David Morris reflects a point of view expressed by Leon Kass at about the
same time. Kass observed, in the spirit of Aristotle, that "ethics is impotent without
politics-without careful attention to law and custom and the ordering of civic
life." Leon R. Kass, Practicing Ethics: Where's the Action?, 20 HASTINGS CTR. REP.,Jan.-
Feb. 1990, at 5, 10.
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IX. ENFORCING THE DUTY TO PROVIDE PAIN RELIEF
A. The Standare of Care
Generally, the standard of care for any particular type of medi-
cal care is stated in terms similar to the following:
Each physician may with reason and fairness be expected
to possess or have reasonable access to such medical
knowledge as is commonly possessed or reasonably
available to minimally competent physicians in the same
specialty or general field of practice throughout the
United States. A physician should have a realistic
understanding of the limitations on his or her knowledge
or competence, and, in general, to exercise minimally
adequate medical judgment.
3 6
Such language poses interesting questions with regard to pain
management. Let us consider the issue from the perspective of the
following hypothetical situation.3 77  A patient is diagnosed with
metastatic pancreatic cancer and given a prognosis of survival of no
more than six months.3 78 Her pain is effectively managed by the in-
patient pain service of the hospital where exploratory surgery led to
the diagnosis, but as she approaches discharge her attending physi-
cian dismisses the pain service from the case and drastically reduces
the dosage of opioid analgesics. On the day of discharge the pa-
tient is quite worried because her pain has not been as well con-
trolled as when the pain service was involved. She reasonably an-
ticipates that as the disease progresses, her pain will only become
worse. The physician admonishes her to be strong, that keeping
376. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985).
377. This hypothetical case was the basis for a mock trial that was produced by
the author and videotaped as an educational instrument for health care
professionals with the support of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics
Mayday Scholars Program. See Videotape: Pain Management and Professional
Liability: The Case of Jones v. Ackerman (on file with the Program in Health Care
Ethics, Humanities and Law, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center).
378. A definitive diagnosis of advanced pancreatic cancer is clinically
significant in two respects that are particularly relevant to our analysis. First, the
prognosis is extremely poor, with death extremely likely within months. Second, if
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her on large doses of narcotics for the months she has remaining
would turn her into an addict or a zombie who was "out of it" most
of the time and unable to have any meaningful interaction with her
family. No mention of hospice is made. Trusting his statements,
she continues the pain medication he recommended, but is unable
to tolerate the increasing level of pain. Repeated calls to the physi-
cian result in some tinkering with her prescriptions, but no signifi-
cant increase in the dosage of opioid analgesics and hence no de-
crease in her suffering. Finally, her sister, who has moved in with
her and become her primary caregiver, calls the patient representa-
tive of the hospital where the patient was diagnosed, and demands
that she be readmitted and put under the care of the pain service.
The next day the patient is readmitted to the hospital by her at-
tending physician with a diagnosis of intractable pain and put un-
der the care of the pain service. Within twenty-four hours the pa-
tient is comfortable for the first time since the pain service was
discharged, and the patient and her sister are taught how to con-
tinue to maintain at home the intrathecal catheter through which
the significantly increased dosages of opioid analgesics are now be-
ing provided" 9
Two weeks after the second discharge, the patient dies com-
fortably at home. In the weeks after the patient's death, her sister
is increasingly outraged by the contrast between the palliative care
provided by the pain service and the seemingly insensitive and
opiophobic treatment by the attending physician. She concludes
that but for the attending physician's arrogance (in dismissing the
pain service) and incompetence (in failing to know what consti-
tuted and how to provide effective pain management) her sister
would have had a comfortable and dignified final two months of
life. The sister confers with an attorney and ultimately files a medi-
cal malpractice action against the attending physician alleging that
his care of her sister in the final months of her life was below an ac-
ceptable standard of care. In addition, the physician's inadequate
care resulted in months of severe and unnecessary pain and suffer-
ing for her sister and for herself as her sister's devoted and loving
caregiver.
If we are to believe the literature on pain management, the
379. See generally Michael J. Cousins & Laurence E. Mather, Intrathecal and
Epidural Administration of Opioids, 61 ANESTHESIOLOGY 276 (1984) (summarizing
data on the pharmacology of spinal administration of opioids).
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currently prevailing practice among physicians generally (as op-
posed to specialists in pain management) is to undertreat pain.
The defendant physician might argue that the complaint seeks to
hold clinicians such as him to a higher standard of care than is ac-
tually practiced by most physicians. The mere fact that a dying pa-
tient suffered severe pain in her last months does not mean he was
guilty of medical malpractice. While it is correct that a majority of
jurisdictions traditionally take the position that the usual and cus-
tomary practice sets the standard of care for physicians,80 a minor-
ity of jurisdictions take the position that adherence to customary
practice should not insulate a physician from malpractice liability if
the plaintiff can provide persuasive evidence that the physician has
failed or refused to apply readily available measures which would
have prevented harm to the patient. 3 1
B. TheJudicially Imposed Standard of Care
Quite early in this century Justice Holmes observed: "What
usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what
ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence,
whether it usually is complied with or not." 8' It is, of course, one
thing to refuse to allow nonesoteric commercial enterprises to have
the final word on what should constitute due care in the conduct of
their affairs, but should the same principle apply to the highly
technical and sophisticated practice of medicine? Beginning at
mid-century, a growing number of courts answered that question in
380. See Holt v. Godsil, 447 So. 2d 191, 192 (Ala. 1984).
381. In one of the more recent examples of this approach, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court stated:
[S] hould customary medical practice fail to keep pace with developments
and advances in medical science, adherence to custom might constitute a
failure to exercise reasonable care.... We agree with the parties and the
Medical Society that while evidence of the usual and customary conduct
of others under similar circumstances is ordinarily relevant and
admissible as an indication of what is reasonably prudent, customary
conduct is not dispositive and cannot overcome the requirement that
physicians exercise ordinary care.
Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 271-72 (Wis. 1996); see also Toth v.
Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 373 (N.Y. 1968) ("Evidence that
the defendant followed customary practice is not the sole test of professional
malpractice.").
382. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
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the affirmative. In doing so, they frequently quoted the language
of Justice Holmes and Judge Hand in early tort cases involving
common carriers. For example, in the seminal case of Darling v.
Charleston Community Hospital,83 in which the principle of corporate
negligence for health care institutions was first recognized, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court stated: "By the great weight of modern Ameri-
can authority a custom either to take or omit a precaution is gener-
ally admissible as bearing on what is proper conduct under the
circumstances, but it is not conclusive."3 8  The court went on to
quote Justice Learned Hand's opinion in The T.j Hooper.3
5
The notion that an entire medical specialty, or at least all of
the members in a particular locale would never be guilty of negli-
gence, i.e., by adhering to a "substandard" standard of care, was vo-
ciferously debunked by a Louisiana appellate court in a case involv-
ing a radiologist:
We are firm in the opinion that it is patently absurd,
unreasonable and arbitrary to hold that immunity from
tort liability may be predicated upon a degree of care or
procedure amounting to negligence notwithstanding such
procedure is generally followed by other members of the
profession in good standing in the same communityM
6
Inherent in the court's analysis is the position that it would be
both unreasonable and unconscionable for a court to create an ir-
rebuttable presumption that a standard practice among physicians
can never constitute a failure to exercise reasonable care with re-
gard to patients.'8 The most often-cited case in which a court es-
sentially condemned an entire medical specialty is Helling v.
Carey. In this case, an ophthalmologist cared for a patient for
nearly ten years before diagnosing primary open angle glaucoma.3 9
During this period there was a simple, painless, and inexpensive
383. 211 N.E.2d 253 (IM. 1965).
384. Id. at 257 (quoting 2 HARPER ANDJONES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.3, at 977-
78 (1965)).
385. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). See supra note 212 and accompanying
text.
386. Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544, 551 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
387. See id.
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test for glaucoma. The defendant's failure to utilize this test was
supported by the uncontroverted testimony of the medical experts,
all of whom took the position that the standard of care among oph-
thalmologists was not to routinely administer that test to patients
under the age of forty.3 9' The plaintiff was thirty-two at the time her
glaucoma was diagnosed.392 After quoting Justice Hand, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court then paraphrased him in the articulation of
its holding:
Under the facts of this case reasonable prudence required
the timely giving of the pressure test to this plaintiff. The
precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of
glaucoma to patients under 40 years of age is so
imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the
standards of the ophthalmology profession, it is the duty
of the courts to say what is required to protect patients
under 40 from the damaging results of glaucoma.
We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the reasonable
standard that should have been followed under the
undisputed facts of this case was the timely giving of this
simple, harmless pressure test to this plaintiff and that, in
failing to do so, the defendants were negligent, which
proximately resulted in the blindness sustained by the
plaintiff for which the defendants are liable.Y
The plaintiff had not produced any expert testimony in sup-
port of the testing of patients under age forty for glaucoma
3 9 4
However, a survey of Washington ophthalmologists revealed that
prior to Helling between 20.3% and 30.1% of the respondents re-
ported that they tested for glaucoma regularly.395 Such numbers
would certainly constitute a "respectable minority" of physicians
who were operating within what might be characterized as an
390. See id.
391. See id.
392. See id. at 982.
393. Id. at 983.
394. See id. at 982.
395. See Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An
Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 383 (1981).
[Vol. 26:1
74
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss1/3
PRESCRIPTION FOR PAIN
emerging but not yet officially recognized standard of care.!" In
the practice of pain management, there is also a "respectable mi-
nority" of physicians who currently practice within an emerging
standard where most pain can be effectively managed, and reason-
able prudence mandates that efforts be directed toward that end to
minimize or eliminate unnecessary suffering.' 97
C. Informed Consent: The Paradigm Case of ajudicially-Imposed
Standard of Care
Prior to the middle of this century, physicians had neither a
legal duty nor any recognized ethical responsibility to obtain the
informed consent of their patients prior to performing an invasive
396. In the early 1950s, an emerging or developing standard of care caught
physicians (and their young patients) in tragic circumstances. See Toth v.
Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (N.Y. 1968). That was the
period when physicians recognized the relationship between the administration of
sustained high doses of oxygen to infants born prematurely and the development
of retrolental fibroplasia (RLF). See id. Physicians gradually dismissed the view
that these high doses were necessary to prevent brain damage, despite developing
evidence that the risk of RLF in this population from high levels of oxygen was
greater than the risk of brain damage from decreased levels. See id. Applying the
approach of Helling in an RLF case, a New York court declared that: "There is no
policy reason why a physician, who knows or believes there are unnecessary
dangers in the community practice, [high oxygen doses to premature infants]
should not be required to take whatever precautionary measures he deems
appropriate." Id. at 273.
397. The grounds for saying that there is still only a minority of physicians who
believe and practice in this way are the alarming statistics indicating that large
numbers of patients with pain problems which would be quite manageable if state-
of-the-art techniques were applied continue to report significant pain. SeeJamie
H. Von Roenn et al., Physician Attitudes and Practice in Cancer Pain Management, 119
ANNALs INTERNAL MED. 121, 124 (1993), which concludes with the following grim
prognosis:
Despite the fact that, for at least two decades, most major medical
journals and the lay media have recognized that many patients have
needless pain, this survey of specialists in cancer care suggests that 1)
education in pain management remains substandard and, as a result, the
practice of pain management is often substandard; 2) communication
between physicians and patients about pain continues to be hampered by
poor or nonexistent assessment and patient misinformation; and 3) some
physicians are still reluctant to use the most effective analgesics and
adjuvant medications for pain management. Change will occur only with
the concerted and collaborative efforts of health care professionals,
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procedure that entailed significant and identifiable risks."' 8 In or-
der to avoid liability for battery, a physician was not required to ob-
tain the patient's informed consent to the procedure; an unin-
formed consent would suffice.'9 In the 1950s, a novel cause of
action began to be asserted in malpractice suits against physi-
cians-the failure to obtain informed consent.400 Since the long-
standing custom and practice in the profession had been one of si-
lence,401 it was virtually impossible to produce expert medical
testimony that the standard of care required that a physician dis-
close the risks and benefits of a proposed treatment, and alterna-
tives (including doing nothing) and their risks and benefits, so that
the patient could give an informed consent.42 Thus, we can rea-
sonably surmise that most efforts to persuade courts to adopt this
novel theory of malpractice liability did not survive a timely motion
398. As the President's Commission study of informed consent noted:
The physician's duty to disclose information about treatment is what
distinguishes the informed consent doctrine from the earlier
requirement of consent to treatment, in which a physician satisfied his or
her obligation to patients if patient's merely understood in a general way
the nature of the medical procedures that would take place. By contrast,
the informed consent doctrine requires that patients be provided with a
greater quantity of information to enable them to make intelligent
choices about treatment.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE
ETHICA L AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-
PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 194 (1982).
399. See Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
Judge Cardozo's resplendent language in Schloendorff that: "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body" was nothing more than a recognition that a patient's uninformed
consent was required. Id. Standard medical practice not only eschewed informing
patients of the details of their conditions and the risks inherent in the procedures
they recommended, but actually discouraged such disclosures on the grounds that
they would discourage patients from undergoing necessary treatment and
undermine the efficacy of those treatments by increasing the level of anxiety. For
a detailed account by a physician of the medical profession's antipathy toward
dialogue between physician and patient, see KATZ, supra note 134.
400. For a comprehensive history of the development of the doctrine of
informed consent, see generally FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 372.
401. See generally KATZ, supra note 134.
402. The Hippocratic corpus is replete with admonitions to physicians to tell
the patient as little as possible about the nature of his or her condition and
treatment. See generally THE MEDICAL WORKS OF HIPPOCRATES (John Chadwick &
W.N. Mann trans., 1950).
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to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. In order for a plaintiff to succeed in such a claim in the
absence of any general acceptance of such a practice by medical
practitioners, courts had to be persuaded to find as a matter of law
that the custom of silence and nondisclosure was in some sense
substandard practice. Remarkably, the courts gradually began to
accept that rationale.
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees'5 was the
first case to actually use the term "informed consent.",404 The court
stated that "[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and sub-
jects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary
to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the
proposed treatment.",4 5 The court then identified the desired ob-
jective as "the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed con-
sent.",46 As Jay Katz observes in his analysis of the opinion in Salgo,
some of its language was actually drawn from an amicus curiae brief
filed by the American College of Surgeons, which acknowledged
that a physician, particularly when advocating the use of a relatively
new procedure, such as aortography was in the mid-1950's, has a
duty to advise the patient of the risks inherent in the procedure. 
4
0
Three years later in Natanson v. Kline,4°' the Kansas Supreme
Court more fully articulated the physician's duty to obtain the pa-
tient's informed consent.4 In Natanson, Irma Natanson com-
menced action against radiologist Dr. John Kline for severe, disfig-
403. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1957).
404. See id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 181. The factual background of the Salgo case involves a 55-year old
man suffering from painful leg cramps and intermittent limping who underwent
an aortography in an effort to locate a suspected block in the abdominal aorta. See
id. at 172-74. The morning after the procedure, which involved the injection of a
solution of sodium urokon dye, Salgo discovered that both of his legs were
paralyzed. See id. at 174-75. Among his claims of malpractice, he alleged that he
should have been, but was not warned of the risk of paralysis. See id. at 181.
407. See KATZ, supra note 134, at 61-62. Demonstrating an admirable solicitude
for patient autonomy and welfare, the American College of Surgeons in its amicus
curiae brief was, in effect, declaring the usual and customary practice of the
profession in the area of risk disclosure to be substandard. See American College
of Surgeons' Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant and Appellant Frank
Gerbode, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (No. 17045). The literature and clinical practice guidelines
on pain management do precisely the same thing.
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uring injuries that resulted from his administration of cobalt ther-
apy following her mastectomy.41 0  The trial court had denied her
request for an instruction to the jury that physicians have a duty to
warn patients of the risks of treatments, which they recommend.41
Justice Schroeder, writing for the court, employed language clearly
drawn from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Schloendo4 1 2 that was
thereafter quoted by many other courts which came to recognize
informed consent as an integral part of the physician's professional
responsibility to patients:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-
going self determination. It follows that each man is
considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance
of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A
doctor might well believe that an operation or form of
treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not
permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the
patient by any form of artifice or deception. 13
However, the opinion allowed ample room for physician dis-
cretion. After recognizing a duty to disclose important information
to the patient, the court then held that the determination of what
information must be disclosed is that which a reasonable medical
practitioner would, in the sound exercise of medical judgment,
414
choose to make known under the same or similar circumstances.
Interestingly, one of the cases that the Natanson court men-
tioned with apgroval was a Minnesota decision, Bang v. Charles T
Miller Hospital, which did not appear to give physicians quite so
much discretion in determining what must be disclosed to pa-
410. See id. at 1095.
411. See id. at 1099.
412. See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
413. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104. This language supports much more than
just a patient's right to informed consent or refusal. It is broad enough to
constitute a right to refuse any and all treatment, including that which is necessary
to sustain life, as was later recognized by both state and federal courts. See, e.g.,
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
414. SeeNatanson, 350 P.2d at 1107.
415. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
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tients. 416 In that case, a surgeon failed to disclose to a patient who
was about to undergo a transurethral resection of the prostate that
the procedure as performed would involve tying off the sperm
ducts, while other treatments would not.47 In finding a breach of
the duty to disclose, that court stated:
It is our opinion that a reasonable rule is that, where a
physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an
operation alternative situations and no immediate
emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the
alternative possibilities and given a chance to decide
before the doctor proceeds with the operation.18
The limitations inherent in this characterization of the duty
can perhaps best be seen by returning to our central focus-a pro-
posed duty to effectively manage pain. If the typical physician has
been shown in study after study to undertreat pain, then finding a
duty to provide pain relief while at the same time limiting the ex-
tent of that duty to the type of pain relief that a reasonable medical
practitioner would give under the same or similar circumstances is
tantamount to taking back with the left hand what one has just be-
stowed with the right. If, as Katz has demonstrated, there has been
a centuries-old medical custom of nondisclosure, then a newly-
fashioned duty to disclose cannot be grounded on what a reason-
able medical practitioner would disclose under the same or similar
circumstances. The fatal flaw in this reasoning was recognized by a
federal court in the final informed consent case that we will con-
sider.
Judge Robinson's opinion in Canterbury v. Spence 9 is perhaps
the best known in the jurisprudence of informed consent. Most
importantly for our purposes, he directly confronted the problem
just noted with regard to the Natanson case with admirable candor:
There are, in our view, formidable obstacles to acceptance
of the notion that the physician's obligation to disclose is
either germinated or limited by medical practice. To
416. See id.
417. See id. at 187-89.
418. Id. at 190.
419. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
79
Rich: A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pa
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
begin with, the reality of any discernable custom reflecting
a professional consensus on communication of option
and risk information to patients is open to serious doubt.
We sense the danger that what in fact is no custom at all
may be taken as an affirmative custom to maintain
silence.... Respect for the patient's right of self-
determination on particular therapy demands a standard
set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves.20
Applying this language to a purported duty to effectively man-
age pain, a court might well conclude that the medical literature
over the last quarter century constitutes not merely a preponder-
ance, but clear and convincing evidence that under prevailing
medical practice there is a custom of undertreating pain. What is
necessary, therefore, in order to protect patients from the persis-
tent inability or refusal by physicians to acquire and apply state-of-
the-art pain management knowledge and skills is a standard of care
set for physicians by law.42' In the case of pain management, how-
ever, the courts have more to work with than the proverbial tabla
rasa with which they were confronted when they undertook to in-
terject informed consent into the silent world of doctor and pa-
tient. In undertaking to define what the standard of care should be
for pain management, the courts can mine the rich resources of
the clinical practice guidelines crafted by the most knowledgeable
and experienced pain management and palliative care practitio-
ners in the United States.
420. Id. at 783-84.
421. While on first impression the idea that a court is in any sense qualified to
set a standard of care for physicians might seem quite absurd, in certain situations,
such as that regarding pain management, further reflection reveals a plausible
rationale. Those most knowledgeable in pain management have established
nationally-recognized guidelines. The reasons offered by practitioners for not
following the guidelines are not based on any scientific basis but rather on
ignorance and fear. What we have then, is a concerted refusal by a significant
portion of the medical community to follow clinical practice guidelines which are
intended to minimize harm (from unnecessary pain and suffering) to patients.
The force of law appears to be what is required to "persuade" these recalcitrant
practitioners to conform to an acceptable standard of practice.
422. See generally AHCPR, supra note 121.
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D. Clinical Practice Guidelines and the Standard of Care
Judicial standard-setting such as what took place in Helling v.
Carey has been criticized. For example, the court seemed to pay lit-
tle or no attention to the implications of the high rate of false posi-
tive results of tonometry.423 Furthermore, clinical experience sug-
gests that early detection and treatment does not necessarily
424prevent or even significantly retard the progression of glaucoma.
Except in non-technical situations such as informed consent, it is
suggested that courts run the risk of reaching beyond their compe-
tence when they seek to set standards of technical performance for
other professions.42 ' However, judicial standard-setting need not
necessarily be flawed in this way. There are circumstances, and
pain management is perhaps the most obvious, in which clinical
practice guidelines have been formulated, but they have not yet in-
fluenced the custom and practice of physicians to any significant de-
gree. When there is persuasive evidence that clinical practice guide-
lines developed by nationally-recognized experts in the field exist,
those guidelines can and should be recognized as the standard of
care.426 The fact that physicians in general have failed to incorpo-
rate those guidelines into their custom and practice should not be
dispositive of the issue of liability. This is especially true when the
evidence shows that adherence to the guidelines in question would
raise the quality of patient care from what is customarily pro-
vided.427
423. SeeBARRYR. FURROWETAL., HEALTH LAW 177 n.1 (3d ed. 1997).
424. See Eric E. Fortess & Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic
Testing, and Legal Liability, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 213, 217 (1985).
425. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California presents another notable
example ofjudicial standard-setting in an aspect of clinical practice is in which the
California Supreme Court held that a therapist treating a mentally ill patient owes
a duty of reasonable care to warn persons about whom the patient makes
threatening statements of dangers created by the patients condition. See 551 P.2d
334, 343 (Cal. 1976). For an assessment of the impact of Tarasoff on clinical
practice, see DanielJ. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study
of Private Law in Action, Wis. L. REV. 443 (1984).
426. Recent studies indicate that following clinical practice guidelines can
improve the quality of pain relief patients receive, but achieving this beneficial
outcome requires a concerted and sustained institutional initiative to change
physician behavior. See, e.g., American Pain Society Quality of Care Committee,
Quality Improvement Guidelines for the Treatment of Acute Pain and Cancer Pain, 274
JAMA 1874 (1995).
427. For an extensive analysis of the basis for the recognition by courts of
clinical practice guidelines as the standard of care, see Richard E. Leahy, Rational
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The era of managed health care into which we have moved
with revolutionary speed during the last decade has spawned a
plethora of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs). The general pur-
pose of such guidelines is suggested by their definition, "systemati-
cally developed statements to assist practitioner and patient deci-
sions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances."428 There is a significant and ongoing debate as to
whether CPGs should play an influential role in shaping the stan-
dard of care for any particular area of clinical practice.4 2 9 There is a
general suspicion that CPGs developed by large, for-profit managed
care organizations will constitute a concerted effort to ratchet down
the prevailing standard of care in the service of cost reduction. 3°
However, in the case of pain management guidelines such as those
produced by the AHCPR and the American Pain Society, the pur-
pose is precisely the opposite. The prevailing, unjustifiably low
standard of care would be elevated by the widespread adoption of
these guidelines by medical practitioners. 3'
Traditionally, as has been noted, the development and recog-
nition of a standard of care for some aspect of clinical practice was
directly linked to the custom and practice of the profession. Judi-
cial deference was an inherent aspect of this approach, on the the-
ory that only physicians are in a position to determine what consti-
tutes acceptable medical practice. What is particularly intriguing
about recently developed national guidelines for pain management
is that they are the work of a small subset of the medical profession,
such as those who specialize in pain management, and they clearly
do not reflect the practice patterns of most physicians. Neverthe-
Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical
Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1483 (1989).
428. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE: FROM
DEVELOPMENT TO USE 2 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992).
429. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE
PARAMETERS (1990); Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard
of Care in Malpractice Litigation?, 266JAMA 2886 (1991).
430. See NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, COLLOQUIUM REPORT ON
LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO CLINICAL PRACtiCE GUIDELINES 23-24 (1995).
431. See, e.g., Stefan Grond et al., Validation of World Health Organization
Guidelines for Cancer Pain Relief During the Last Days and Hours of Life, 6 J. PAIN &
SYMPT. MGMT. 411 (1991); V. Ventafridda et al., A Validation Study of the WHO
Method for Cancer Pain Relief 59 CANCER 851 (1987).
432. See Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51
IND. L.J. 528, 538-57 (1976).
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less, the guidelines are intended to positively influence the behav-
iors of all physicians who care for patients with pain, and not simply
those who aspire to become pain specialists."' Consequently, judi-
cial recognition of national CPGs for pain management would con-
stitute a shift from the customary practice version of the standard
of care. The concern would no longer be to determine what physi-
cians generally do in caring for patients with pain, but to determine
what they should be doing.4  When courts proceed in this fashion,
they implicitly recognize, as did Judge Hand in The T.J. Hooper,3 5
that an entire profession may lag behind in its practices, but they
are much less vulnerable than the Helling court to the critique that
no medical authority in the record supported the judicial determi-
nation of the standard of care. For example, the court's recogni-
tion of the AHCPR Clinical Practice Guidelines as the national
standard of care for pain management, would shift the inquiry of
the trier of fact from what physicians customarily do to what they
436ought to do. A demonstrable failure to become conversant with
and make a good faith effort to comply with such guidelines in the
care of patients with pain would shift the burden of proof to the
defendant physician to justify a material deviation from the guide-
lines.437 An actual example of such an approach follows.
433. There is a legitimate concern that the development of recognized
specialty groups in pain management and palliative care will suggest that
physicians generally need not develop and maintain proficiency in these aspects of
clinical practice, but need only refer patients to or obtain consultations from such
specialists when significant problems persist. With the ever-increasing shift toward
managed care and its heavy reliance on primary care physicians, such an approach
would exacerbate the problem of under-treated pain and poor quality end-of-life
care. Consequently, prominent pain specialists share the view of Kathleen Foley
who insists that: "All physicians should be familiar with the use of analgesics to
manage acute and chronic pain in medical illness effectively. The patient's
primary physician should assume this role." Foley, supra note 59, at 15.
434. Leahy makes precisely this point in his article on CPGs and the standard
of care. See Leahy, supra note 427, at 1525.
435. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
436. Further impetus for and justification of the recognition of the AHCPR
pain management guidelines as a national standard has been provided by the
recent promulgation of model pain management guidelines by the Federation of
State Medical Licensing Boards, inasmuch as these model guidelines specifically
incorporate the AHCPR guidelines by reference. See FEDERATION OF STATE
MEDICAL LICENSING BOARDS, MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN (1998). As more state medical boards
adopt these or similar guidelines, an implicit recognition of the AHCPR guidelines
as the national standard may clearly emerge.
437. See Leahy, supra note 427, at 1525.
20001
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E. A Case in Point-James v. Hillhaven Corp.
Given the documentation of a widespread practice among
health care professionals of undertreating pain, it may be surpris-
ing to learn that there are no reported cases in which a physician
has been held liable for allowing a patient to suffer because of a
failure to provide appropriate pain relief.48 However, in February
of 1999, what appears to be the first malpractice suit against a phy-
sician grounded primarily upon the physician's failure to properly
manage a patient's pain, was filed in the Superior Court of Califor-
nia. " The patient, now deceased, and his primary physician were
also involved in a complaint of substandard care filed with the Cali-
fornia Medical Board."0 The complaint against the physician, Eden
Medical Center, and others sought general, special and punitive
damages for medical negligence, willful misconduct, and negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the patient
and his family, the plaintiffs in the action.4 The complaint was not
filed until after the medical board concluded that inadequate pain
relief had been provided but declined to take any disciplinary ac-
tion against the physician. 2
A plausible explanation for the absence of such suits is that lay
persons generally assume that most health professionals actually do
manage pain as effectively as possible without creating unreason-
able risk of harm from the side effects of narcotic analgesics. Con-
sequently, unrelieved pain and suffering from illness or infirmity is
presumed to be genuinely "intractable," in other words, beyond the
powers of medical science to safely and effectively alleviate and with
which the patient must learn to cope.443
438. A possible exception is Gaddis v. United States, 7 F. Supp.2d 709 (D. S.C.
1997). This medical malpractice judgment in excess of $1 million against the
Veterans Administration did include an award of $125,000 for pain and suffering
based largely upon the defendant's failure to provide sufficient pain medication
during the final days of the patient's life. See id. at 717. However, the primary
claim and the bulk of the total damage award was based upon a failure to timely
diagnose and properly treat the patient's throat cancer. See id.





443. Patient satisfaction surveys have at times failed to establish a correlation
between significant levels of pain and patient dissatisfaction with care, suggesting
that yet another barrier to improving pain management is exceeding the low
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An unreported case has achieved a certain degree of notoriety
by virtue of its mention in a medical journal."4 The patient in this
case, Henry James, was an elderly resident of a nursing home
owned by the defendant corporation who was dying of metastatic
prostate cancer." 5 He came to the North Carolina facility with a
prescription for morphine to control his pain."8 A nurse employed
by the defendant concluded that Mr. James was "addicted to mor-• ,447
phine. She made the determination that the patient should re-
ceive only a mild tranquilizer for such distress as he might encoun-
ter in his dying without consulting with the prescribing physician or
any other medical professional.W Following his death, Mr. James's
family sued the nurse and her employer alleging that her refusal to
provide the prescribed morphine caused him to suffer significant
and unnecessary pain, suffering, and mental anguish and consti-
tuted "inhuman treatment." 9
At trial, the plaintiff presented testimony by medical experts
from the National Institutes of Health substantiating the appropri-
ateness of administering sustained doses of morphine for the man-
agement of cancer pain.4 ' ° Additional expert testimony was pre-
sented by a nurse specializing in quality assurance for long term
care facilities, who indicated that among the well-recognized rights
of patients, particularly those who are terminally ill, is appropriate
pain management."
patient expectations of pain relief. See, e.g., Christine Miaskowski et al., Assessment
of Patient Satisfaction Utilizing the American Pain Society's Quality Assurance Standards
on Acute and Cancer-Related Pain, 9J. PAIN & SyMpr. MGMT. 5,9-10 (1994).
444. See Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp., No. 89 CVS 64 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 15, 1991). See, e.g., Robyn S. Shapiro, Liability Issues in the Management of
Pain, 9J. PAIN & SYMPrr. MGMT. 146, 147 (1994).





450. See Telephone interview with Mickey Herrin, Esq., Defense Counsel for
Hillhaven Corp. (May 1996.)
451. See Shapiro, supra note 444, at 147. Among the national professional
organizations that have recognized the duty to provide effective pain relief to
dying patients is the JCAHO. See Accreditation Manual, Patient Rights,
RI.1.1.2.2.2; AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHics, § 2.20 (American Nurses Association,
Compendium of Position Statement on Promotion of Comfort and Relief of Pain
in Dying Patients). Both the AMA and ANA pronouncements go so far as to
affirm the appropriateness, when necessary, of administering large doses of
narcotic analgesics, even if they might hasten death. See id.
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The jury returned a verdict of $7.5 million in compensatory
damages and another $7.5 million in punitive damages.452 Motions
by the defendant to set aside the verdict and for a new trial had
been taken under advisement by the trial judge when the insurance
carrier for Hillhaven promptly settled the case for an undisclosed
amount that was approved by the court.
5 3
The case of Henry James bears a striking resemblance to a sce-
nario recounted by Margaret Sommerville in an address to the 7th
World Congress on Pain.454 The critical difference between the two
is that the patient in the latter was in a hospital rather than a nurs-
ing home. In addition, the health care professional whose conduct
was at issue was a physician rather than a nurse. As Sommerville re-
lates the story, a physician on night call at a Canadian hospital was
summoned to the bedside of a man in severe pain from metastatic
prostate cancer. 45u When she examined his chart, the only pain
medication that had been ordered was Tylenol. She changed the
order to morphine, which brought his pain under control, and in-
structed the nursing staff to administer it on a continuing basis to
keep the patient comfortable.457 Two nights later she was again tak-
ing night call and was summoned by a nurse to the same patient. 4 58
On her way to see the patient, the physician commented that a
higher dose of morphine would probably be necessary. 459 The
452. See Shapiro, supra note 444, at 147.
453. See Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp., No. 89 CVS 64 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 15, 1991). What is striking about the jury's verdict in the James case is not
just its sheer magnitude, but the sense of moral outrage which the punitive
damage award expresses. In assessing the settlement value of the case, the
defendants, their counsel, and the insurance company sought to answer a
straightforward question: what could a few months of pain be worth? The jury's
answer suggests a monumental disparity in the significance attached to the
practice of undertreated pain between the general public and health professionals
and those who regulate, employ, insure, and represent them. The jury's clear
message that undertreated pain, particularly in the case of patients who only have
a few months to live, is a moral outrage lends credence to Eric Cassell's much
earlier observation that the relief of suffering is considered by the lay public, but
not by physicians, to be one of the primary ends of medicine. See Cassell, supra
note 4, at 639.
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nurse told her the patient was not on morphine, but Tylenol.4 6°
Remarkably, the very next day the patient's attending physician had
reversed the order for morphine.46' The patient was back on Tyle-
nol, and the physician actually went so far as to write a note in the
chart that he would not have his patients turned into drug ad-
dicts.42 A complaint to hospital administration by the night call
physician produced nothing but a timid response that they were
aware of this physician's attitude toward narcotic analgesics.
However, the doctor had resisted any suggestion that he modify his
pain management practices.4
Professor Sommerville, a Canadian attorney, suggests that a
"radical" response to such unconscionable situations would be
malpractice litigation.45 The case of Henry James suggests that ini-
tiating a malpractice suit alleging a duty to appropriately manage
pain is not all that radical given the history of American medical ju-
risprudence. It would simply be the latest instance in which medi-
cine's failure to set, in a timely way, a standard of care consistent
with reasonable prudence and humane care resulted in judicial
standard-setting.
In the hypothetical case outlined at the beginning of this sec-
tion,4 the strength of the plaintiff's case from a clinical perspective
draws upon several elements. First, because the patient was made
comfortable when under the care of the pain service during both
hospitalizations, roughly two months apart, the defense cannot
credibly claim that her pancreatic cancer, at any point along the
continuum, was producing pain that was in any practical sense un-
manageable. Furthermore, the effective control of her pain at
home during the last two weeks of her life clearly indicates that she
did not require hospitalization in order to achieve pain relief. In
each instance, the hospital was merely the conduit through which
the patient gained access to clinicians with the knowledge, skills,
and attitudes that were necessary to provide her with the required
type of pain relief.






465. See id. at 49.
466. See supra Section IX.A.
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members of the pain service as the applicable standard, one possi-
ble element of the defense will be that such a standard is too high
when applied to all physicians, rather than to only those who spe-
cialize in pain management and palliative care. However, in dis-
charging the pain service and changing the pain management
regimen, the patient's attending physician was implying that he
knew more than, or at least as much as those on the pain service
about what the patient required. As a result, the physician may well
be estopped from asserting at trial that it is unreasonable to hold
him to a standard of care which they were capable of, and in fact
did provide to the patient. He also had ample evidence, during the
period between the two hospitalizations, which his regimen was not
providing the patient with adequate pain control. At the very least,
due diligence would require that the physician acknowledge the
ineffectiveness of his treatment and seek further consultation on
the case from the pain service. Another option which the attend-
ing physician failed to offer the patient was a referral to a local
hospice, which in all likelihood would also have been able to pro-
vide her with an appropriate level of comfort care in her home in
the months before her death.
The patient should have little difficulty producing an expert in
the field of pain management who will testify that the most impor-
tant distinction between the palliative care provided by the pain
service and that provided by the defendant physician is that the
former was consistent with the AHCPR clinical practice guide-
lines ,67 while the latter was not. If the jurisdiction is one in which
the medical board has adopted guidelines similar to the Federation
model,4M the language may be sufficient to support the argument
that they have implicitly incorporated the national guidelines as the
applicable standard for all physicians in the state.
Ultimately, the strength or weakness of the plaintiffs case may
be of less significance than the posture of the jurisdiction in which
it arises with regard to recovery of damages for pain and suffering
in medical malpractice cases. This is true especially when, as here,
the claim is being brought on behalf of a now-deceased patient.
Tort reform in many jurisdictions has created significant disparities
in the viability of a claim such as the one we are considering.49 The
467. See generally AHCPR, supra note 121.
468. See FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL LICENSING BOARDS, supra note 436.
469. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Learning from Experience, Malpractice Reforms
[Vol. 26:1
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next section considers this issue.
X. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
We can see from the James case that North Carolina is an ex-
ample of a jurisdiction in which the changes wrought by tort re-
form legislation do not preclude a sizeable recovery for non-
economic damages such as pain and suffering in an action initiated
by a personal representative after the death of the injured party
470
from causes unrelated to the injury. Such jurisdictions have not
capped pain and suffering awards at some arbitrary figure such as
$500,000 or in some instances even as low as $250,000. 411 Nor do
they preclude a claim for pain and suffering from surviving the
death of the injured party so that it can be pursued by the personal
representative. In a jurisdiction that had modified traditional
tort law in these two ways, Henry James's claim would have died
with him, and the only possible recovery would be for the pain and
suffering of his family in observing his last painful months of life.
There would be little enthusiasm on the part of prospective counsel
for pressing a novel medical malpractice claim in one of these re-
form jurisdictions.
If under-treated pain gains recognition as a material departure
from an emerging standard of care, there may be a persuasive pub-
lic policy justification for amending those statutory provisions that
unduly restrict claims based upon a departure from it. After all,
the only meaningful recovery for the victims of the undertreated
pain of a terminal illness is one based upon unnecessary pain and
suffering, and the only practicable way that such a claim can be
pursued is through a personal representative of the estate. The
jury in the James case, through the magnitude of its verdict, sent a
strong message that should be acknowledged by legislators in states
that are currently hostile environments for similar cases. That
unequivocal message is that when a patient has only a few months
of life remaining, freedom from unnecessary pain and suffering is a
matter of extreme consequence to the patient and those who are
close to them. A few months of such pain, when it is avoidable
in the 1990's: Past Disappointments, Future Success?, 20J. HEALTH POE. POL'Y & L. 99
(1995).
470. See supra notes 452-53 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
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through the application of readily available state-of-the-art palliative
medicine, is a civil wrong for which significant damages ought to be
recoverable for those representing the interests of the victim of
medical malpractice.
XI. CONCLUSION
The heated debate over physician-assisted suicide has finally,
or so it seems, forced the medical profession to examine the extent
to which it has tolerated a deplorable amount of ignorance, misin-
formation, and paranoia to prevent the emerging standard of prac-
tice for pain management and palliative care from informing, in-
deed, transforming clinical practice patterns. But the prevailing
perception is that there is only a clinical problem to be sorted out
entirely within the profession. If such a proposition had been put
to the public and policy makers by the health care profession
twenty-five years ago, when data suggesting the nature and extent
of the problem first emerged, a regulatory and legal moratorium
might have been justified. But as we have seen, there has been a
quarter century in which the voices of reform within health care
have been crying in a wilderness of denial, disinterest and en-
trenchment in the failed practices of the past. Now one can justi-
fiably argue that meaningful change, i.e., adherence to a recog-
nized standard of care in which unrelieved pain is extremely rare in
any patient care setting, can only happen when medical ethics and
medical jurisprudence are brought to bear in such a way as to cre-
ate genuine professional and institutional accountability. The ob-
jective of such reform measures must be to make abundantly clear
that allowing patients to suffer unnecessarily constitutes an unpro-
fessional and unethical medical practice that will not be tolerated
by the larger society which medicine exists to serve.
One of the most important legacies of the litigation over the
purported right to physician-assisted suicide may be the signifi-
cance which a majority of the justices attached to effective pain re-
lief for dying patients in Washington v. Glucksberg.473 The opinions of
473. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Although accounts in the popular press generally
focused on the unanimous decision of the Court against a right to physician-
assisted suicide, a number of legal commentators discussed the pain management
aspect of the concurring opinions in the major medical journals. See George J.
Annas, The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 337 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1098, 1098 (1997); Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not
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five of the justices in the physician-assisted suicide Glucksberg case
either directly stated or strongly intimated that state laws or other
forms of state action which placed undue burdens upon a physi-
cian's ability to provide, or a patient's ability to secure palliative
measures might not survive close judicial scrutiny.74 The broader
implication is that this nation's highest court believes that provid-
ing patients with state-of-the-art pain relief is a matter of great con-
sequence with moral, legal, and even constitutional dimensions. 75
Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234
(1997); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom: From Quinlan
to Cruzan, Glucksberg and Vacco: A Brief History and Analysis of Constitutional
Protection of the Right to Die, 278JAMA 1523 (1997).
474. Justice O'Connor's brief concurring opinion in this case contains the
following important observation:
The parties and amici agree that in these States [Washington and New
York] a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is
experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication,
from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of
causing unconsciousness and hastening death .... In this light,... I
agree that the State's interests in protecting those who are not truly
competent or facing imminent death, or those whose decisions to hasten
death would not be truly voluntary, are sufficiently weighty to justify a
prohibition against physician-assisted suicide.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-37 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring). While Justice
Ginsberg joined in this concurrence without further comment, id. at 789, other
concurring justices expanded and elaborated on issue of pain relief raised by these
cases. Justice Breyer, for example, added the following points:
As Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force a dying
person to undergo that kind of pain.... Rather, the laws of New York
and Washington do not prohibit doctors from providing patients with
drugs sufficient to control pain despite the risk that those drugs
themselves will kill.... Were the legal circumstances different-for
example, were state law to prevent the provision of palliative care,
including the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end
of life-then the law's impact upon serious and otherwise avoidable
physical pain (accompanying death) would be more directly at issue.
And as Justice O'Connor suggests, the Court might have to revisit its
conclusions in these cases.
Id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices Stevens, id. at 738, and Souter, id. at
752, also indicated that governmental impediments to the provision of effective
palliative measures would, in and of themselves, warrant further judicial review.
475. For a discussion of moral and legal implications of unrelieved pain, see
Seth F. Kreimer, The Second Time as Tragedy: The Assisted Suicide Cases and the
Heritage of Roe v. Wade, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 863, 887-901 (1997).
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